A California Superior Court recently saw its decision reversed on appeal to the California Court of Appeal over several improper evidentiary rulings in Sabrena Odom v. Los Angeles Community College District, et al., (2025) 331 Cal.Rptr.3d 642.
In reversing a $10 million jury verdict for the plaintiff regarding claims of sexual harassment against the Los Angeles Community College District and the then Vice President of Student Services, the Court of Appeal was clear it did so based on the trial court’s prejudicial errors in the admission of various pieces of evidence. The erroneously admitted evidence, described as irrelevant and damaging “me-too” evidence, came from a witness not similarly situated to the plaintiff and from 20-year-old newspaper articles, among other evidence of the alleged harasser’s misdemeanor convictions.
The trial lasted three weeks in October 2022 with more than 20 witnesses.
The Vice President’s Misdemeanor Convictions and Los Angeles Times Articles Admitted as Improper Character Evidence
In support of her sexual harassment claims against the Vice President, the plaintiff submitted two newspaper articles from the Los Angeles Times published in 1997 and 1998 placed under her door by an individual in 2017 which “detailed [the Vice President’s] past as an LAPD officer and his conviction of sexual assault.” One article referenced allegations of that the Vice President had sexually assaulted a female police officer while the other referenced three domestic abuse allegations against him.
Defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds. Per the trial court, the articles were not being admitted for their truth but rather for Plaintiff’s reaction to same. The plaintiff’s counsel was permitted to read aloud the article and question the Vice President on same. Later, regarding the same articles attached to another document submitted by the plaintiff in response to prior questioning by her employer, the trial court noted as follows: “To the extent the exhibit states her belief and what she believed and what she saw, [plaintiff], that would be admitted for the truth. To the extent it states hearsay, such as the number article [sic], it would be admitted for her response from the request from the college.”
Testimony of a Student Worker Admitted as Improper “Me Too” Evidence
A student worker at Southwest College from 2015 to 2018 filed a sexual harassment lawsuit against the District, the Vice President, and another individual in 2017. The trial court allowed counsel to take this student worker’s deposition and thereafter the defendants sought to exclude her testimony. However, the trial court disagreed with the defendants and allowed her testimony and complaint to be admitted into evidence. Defense counsel argued that her testimony was not “me-too” evidence because the student worker’s allegations were “so vastly different from that of [plaintiff],” in that this individual was a student, in a completely different role than the plaintiff, with allegations nothing like plaintiff’s. The trial court responded:
“It’s really not a fair category as me-too evidence,” and “what it is, is creating a picture that’s quite different than what you have created in your case. So what it’s like to be . . . a student, a co-ed, innocent co-ed at the college. And your picture is different than the plaintiff’s picture. The juror—you can cross-examine [the student worker]. Maybe she’s making everything up. Maybe you can prove that. But the jury is entitled to know there is a different view.”
In response to Defense counsel’s argument that Mr. Gonzalez’ testimony was improper character evidence, the trial court responded:
“In terms of looking at it with respect to the jury . . . . [L]et’s say I have a daughter, college age, and she wants to decide where am I going to go to college. Okay. Is this information that you would like her to have? Is this information that you would like to have? And then you could cross-examine her. [B]ut it does seem to be relevant on that.”
Post-Judgment Proceedings Show Signs of Bias and Result in Disqualification of the Judge Who Presided over the Trial
The defendants moved for a new trial, partial judgment, or remittitur based on excessive noneconomic damages. At hearing on same and in chambers, the trial court made comments “reflecting his personal feelings and perspectives about societal and civil rights advances of Black Americans and the progress our society has made respecting women in the workplace since he was a college student and then a young attorney decades ago,” when race had nothing to do with the issues of this case.
The trial court denied both of the defendants’ motions post-trial motions. Based on the trial court’s comments at the post-trial motion hearing, the defendants filed a motion to disqualify the judge who oversaw the proceedings for cause in March 2023. In response, the assigned judge issued a lengthy “recusal order.” In October 2023, Judge Cheri Pham of the Orange County Superior Court disqualified [the judge who oversaw the trial], stating that the evidence defendants submitted “establishes that during the February 15, 2023 hearing, [the judge] made several irrelevant and inappropriate comments about race and gender.”
The Court of Appeal’s Decision Reverses the Jury’s Award to the Plaintiff
Regarding the newspaper articles and the Vice President’s prior misdemeanor convictions, the Court found that the trial court at first properly admitted the articles as not being for the truth but when the trial court later admitted the articles attached to an exhibit because it reflected the plaintiff’s belief as to what she believed and saw, this was impermissible. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeal explained the trial court essentially allowed the “jury to consider the newspaper articles for their truth…,” and with no evidence in the record of “balancing the probative value and prejudicial effect…,” such as limiting instructions or other mitigating measures. The Court further reasoned:
Unlike the victim described in the 20-year-old articles, here there was no prior relationship between plaintiff and [the Vice President]: no stalking, no restraining orders, no criminal charges. Plaintiff does not claim that [the Vice President] ever touched or threatened her. He never showed plaintiff a gun or brought up the subject of guns; plaintiff is the one who kept bringing up the question whether he had a gun.
Regarding [the Vice President’s] prior convictions, the Court reasoned that “[t]he District never should have been put in the position of having to explain to the jury why the college hired or retained [the Vice President] despite the old convictions.” Finally, the Court also found error in the admission of the student worker’s testimony. Her testimony, as a student, involved internal complaints against the college and a different administrator than the Vice President. In short, the student worker “was not similarly situated to a faculty member like plaintiff; and her testimony was improper character evidence to show a propensity for harassment at the college.”
Looking to the “Me-Too” doctrine, the Court concluded that it “does not permit a plaintiff to present evidence of discrimination against employees outside of the plaintiff’s protected class to show discrimination or harassment against the plaintiff… Although ‘me too’ evidence can be admissible to prove intent, motive, and the like with respect to the plaintiff’s own protected class, it is never admissible to prove an employer’s propensity to harass.” See generally Pinter-Brown v. Regents of University of California, (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 55.
This decision outlines the need for balancing assessments in the admission of evidence. This applies in civil actions beyond those involving employment-related lawsuits. Here, the jury was allowed to consider the articles for their truth, regardless of being inadmissible hearsay and heavily prejudicial. No doubt admission of the articles benefitted the plaintiff at trial, but in doing so the plaintiff detracted from her case not for lack of substantive evidence but for errors in admission of evidence. Parties in all civil cases, employment-related or otherwise, should be mindful to avoid the same.
Further, this emphasizes the need for strict relevance analysis at the trial court level. The Me-Too doctrine, while developing and crucial, is limited. Parties on both sides of similar lawsuits must be vigilant in analyzing potential evidence and witnesses to ensure same are “similarly situated” to the facts and parties of the case at hand.
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