Executive Summary
- What is new: The Ninth Circuit held that the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act does not require as much specificity from plaintiffs at the early stages of a case as Section 2019.210 of the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act does, and that it was an abuse of the district court’s discretion to strike most of the plaintiff’s trade secrets at the outset of discovery.
- Why it matters: The decision clarifies the distinction between the California and federal trade secrets statutes regarding trade secret disclosures, as well as a district court’s authority to order more detailed disclosures under the threat of sanctions.
- What to do next: The ruling may factor into plaintiffs’ decisions about whether to bring state as well as federal claims if the timing of detailed disclosures matters. Meanwhile, defendants seeking to have trade secrets defined with more specificity at the discovery stage can look to alternatives to dismissal offered by the Ninth Circuit and its statements about a district court’s case management authority and discovery oversight powers.
__________
On August 12, 2025, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court ruling striking certain trade secrets asserted by a plaintiff on the grounds that the plaintiff had not spelled out its trade secrets with adequate particularity. The decision, which clarifies the interplay of the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA) and the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), gives DTSA plaintiffs in the Ninth Circuit some leeway in disclosing details of their alleged trade secrets. But the opinion also highlighted district courts’ authority to manage the disclosure of trade secrets, which could benefit DTSA defendants.
Significance of the Ruling
In Quintara Biosciences, Inc. v. Ruifeng Biztech, Inc., et al., No. 23-16093 (9th Cir. Aug. 12, 2025), the court directly confronted what it described as the “delicate problem” encountered by DTSA litigants: When, and with how much particularity, must a plaintiff specify its asserted trade secrets under the federal statute? Two aspects of the decision are particularly noteworthy:
The CUTSA’s “reasonable particularity” rule does not govern DTSA claims. Judge Anthony D. Johnstone, writing for the Ninth Circuit panel alongside Judges Lawrence VanDyke and Dana L. Christensen, found that the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California abused its discretion when it effectively dismissed most of Quintara’s trade secrets that had not been identified in accordance with the CUTSA Section 2019.210’s “reasonable particularity” requirement, which the Ninth Circuit said does not control the DTSA. The court further stated that, under the DTSA, the “fact question of ‘reasonable particularity’ [] should be resolved on summary judgment or at trial.”
Both plaintiffs and defendants in DTSA cases could benefit from different parts of the ruling. This opinion is likely a boon for those plaintiffs reluctant to set forth their alleged trade secrets with particularity early on in litigation. However, as explained below, the opinion offers alternative approaches that may be useful to DTSA defendants seeking to understand the trade secrets asserted against them at the start of litigation and/or as discovery progresses. Furthermore, Quintara does not undo the body of law requiring DTSA plaintiffs to disclose their trade secrets. Rather, it divorces that standard from the specific procedures in Section 2019.210 regarding identification of trade secrets with reasonable particularity before discovery commences.
Background
Both Quintara and Ruifeng are DNA-sequencing-analysis companies based in California. The parties had a business arrangement from 2013 to 2019, but that relationship soured in 2019, leading to the events precipitating the lawsuit. Quintara’s suit featured one count under the DTSA for misappropriating 11 asserted trade secrets. The case was filed in the Northern District of California, with Judge William Alsup presiding.
As early as the Rule 26(f) conference, the parties and district court grappled with the question of whether Quintara had to specify its trade secrets with “reasonable” or “sufficient” particularity at the outset of discovery. The initial debate focused on whether Quintara must meet the CUTSA Section 2019.210 requirement that “before commencing discovery relating to the trade secret, the party alleging the misappropriation shall identify the trade secret with reasonable particularity.”
Ruifeng moved to halt discovery until Quintara further specified its trade secrets under Section 2019.210 and Rule 26. Judge Alsup granted Ruifeng’s motion, and Quintara disclosed in more detail each trade secret. Still unsatisfied, Ruifeng — at the court’s invitation — moved to strike the disclosure under Rule 12(f). Citing its Rule 16 case-management authority, and looking to Section 2019.210, the district court struck the majority of Quintara’s trade secrets that were not disclosed with requisite specificity, effectively dismissing them and leaving only two trade secrets in play.1
The Ninth Circuit’s Analysis
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision on Ruifeng’s motion to strike, holding that the court abused its discretion in striking the trade secrets at the discovery stage. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis principally focused on (i) the nature of the “sufficient particularity” requirement that courts apply to DTSA claims; and (ii) the district court’s authority, or lack thereof, for its ruling.
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by pointing to the elements a trade secret plaintiff must prove to satisfy its DTSA claim. In particular, a plaintiff must show that it possessed a trade secret, which, according to the courts, includes proving that the claimed trade secret has “sufficient particularity to separate it from matters of general knowledge in the trade or of special knowledge of those persons ... skilled in the trade.” The Ninth Circuit stated that the “sufficient particularity” standard applies under the DTSA, while the “reasonable particularity” rule applies to the CUTSA. However, it noted that a plaintiff who satisfies the former may satisfy the latter given their similarities.
Nevertheless, unlike the CUTSA, the Ninth Circuit remarked that “sufficient particularity” is a fact issue under the DTSA, which “does not set out the requirements for the specific timing or scope for identifying trade secrets. Instead, the conventional procedures under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply.”
The Ninth Circuit then looked at the basis for the lower court’s ruling on Ruifeng’s motion. While the defendant brought the motion to strike under Rule 12(f), the district court cited Rule 16 and its ability to manage discovery as supplying the authority for its decision. What’s more, the Ninth Circuit found that the lower court applied the CUTSA’s “reasonable particularity” standard, which “expressly does not control a federal trade-secret claim.” Ultimately, it said that, “based on the facts and procedural posture of this case, neither Rule 12(f) nor Rule 16 authorized the district court to strike — and functionally dismiss —” Quintara’s trade secrets.
First, the Ninth Circuit found that neither Ruifeng nor the district court identified anything strikable from the trade secret disclosure under Rule 12(f). Thus, Rule 12(f) was an improper basis for the court’s decision.
Second, the Ninth Circuit analyzed whether the district court’s effective dismissal of Quintara’s trade secret claims, which constituted a discovery sanction, was an abuse of discretion. Weighing five factors,2 the circuit court ruled that it did. Of particular note was the Ninth Circuit’s discussion of the fifth factor: the availability of less drastic alternatives. By way of example, the Ninth Circuit cited available alternatives:
- The district court could have first limited discovery to whether Quintara identified its trade secrets with sufficient particularity, then invited a motion for summary judgment, and granted that motion if there was no genuine factual dispute as to whether trade secrets were sufficiently particularized.
- If Quintara continued to refuse to supplement its trade secret disclosure to include more particularity, the district court could have excluded evidence of any additional specifications from consideration on summary judgment or at trial.
- In order to put Quintara on proper notice, the district court could have explicitly put Quintara on notice that its disclosure was on pain of dismissal rather than framing this as a mechanism for sequencing discovery.
In sum, the Ninth Circuit remarked that “a DTSA trade-secret claim will rarely be dismissible as a discovery sanction in a situation like this” — i.e., early on in the litigation when the parties have not had an opportunity to further refine and identify the alleged trade secrets through discovery. Further, the district court’s decision went to the merits of plaintiff’s trade secret claim, and the factual question of “reasonable particularity” under the DTSA should be resolved on summary judgment.
Looking Ahead
In view of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, the following considerations are pertinent to trade secrets litigants on both sides of the “v”:
- In bringing its case, a plaintiff should carefully consider from a strategic perspective the statute(s) under which to assert any claims and the forum in which to bring the case. While many plaintiffs elect the “kitchen sink” approach, a CUTSA claim will come with a Section 2019.210 requirement whereas a DTSA claim will not.
- DTSA plaintiffs have certain leeway in how they define the asserted trade secrets prior to discovery commencing. At the very least, in the Ninth Circuit a plaintiff that has otherwise satisfied the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is unlikely to have its trade secrets dismissed early on for failure to identify them with sufficient particularity.
- While finding that the district court in Quintara abused its discretion, the Ninth Circuit nevertheless highlighted the district court’s ability to manage the disclosure of trade secrets in discovery, even offering alternatives to the route taken by the lower court here — all of which could prove useful to DTSA defendants. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion does not foreclose a district court’s ability to enforce an individual or local rule requiring early disclosure as a procedural matter in accordance with these alternatives, were such a rule to be implemented.
- Now more than ever, DTSA defendants should be vigilant about challenging trade secret disclosures. There is still a body of case law requiring adequate trade secret disclosures that remains intact following this opinion, and defendants will want to ensure that the rules are enforced.
_______________
1 The parties conducted discovery on the two remaining trade secrets. Quintara then chose to forego one of these claims, and a jury returned a verdict for Ruifeng on the one trade secret that remained at trial.
2 The five factors weighed in considering whether a dismissal is an appropriate sanction are “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives.”
[View source.]
