Court orders the company to halt anticompetitive tactics, saying the Goliath finally faces serious competition.

U.S. District Judge Amit Mehta this week ruled that Google must execute a number of behavioral remedies, such as halting exclusive arrangements, but spared the company from more severe structural remedies, such as divesting Chrome and Android. The judge also noted that Google is finally facing a serious competitive threat in the form of generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) platforms, such as ChatGPT (UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al v. GOOGLE LLC, 1_20-cv-03010, No. 1436 (D.D.C. Sep. 2, 2025)).

The opinion reflects the court’s intention to balance restoring competition, addressing the consequences of Google’s anticompetitive conduct, and avoiding overly regulatory remedies. But will these new guardrails work? “To predict the efficacy of Judge Mehta’s opinion, all one has to do is look to the behavioral remedies required of Microsoft whose monopoly remains durable,” said Dan Mogin of Mogin Law LLP.

Lessons from Microsoft

The first major antitrust decision against Microsoft came in 2000, when U.S. District Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson ruled that the company had violated the Sherman Act by maintaining a monopoly in the PC operating system market and using anticompetitive tactics to suppress competition in the web browser space — particularly targeting Netscape Navigator. Microsoft’s bundling of Internet Explorer with Windows and its restrictive licensing agreements with PC manufacturers were designed to stifle rival technologies, the court found. Although the initial remedy called for Microsoft to be split into two entities, that decision was overturned on appeal. The case settled in 2001 with Microsoft agreeing to modify its business practices rather than a structural separation.

Microsoft’s competitive practices continue to draw scrutiny today. In late 2024, the Federal Trade Commission began investigating Microsoft’s software licensing, cloud computing, cybersecurity, and artificial intelligence practices. The probe centers on allegations that Microsoft imposes restrictive licensing terms to prevent customers from migrating data from its Azure cloud platform to competitors. Google is among the critics who say Microsoft’s bundling of productivity and security software with its cloud services unfairly locks in customers and stifles competition. The FTC is also scrutinizing Microsoft’s integration of AI tools into Office and Outlook, and its $650 million deal with AI startup Inflection AI.

“While Judge Mehta has a point in his U.S. v. Google opinion about competition from AI,” Mogin said, “Microsoft similarly warned about the rise of Google.”

The Rise of AI

Recent statistics line up with the judge’s findings. As artificial intelligence tools become more sophisticated, users are increasingly turning to platforms like ChatGPT instead of traditional search engines like Google — and the shift is accelerating.

A December 2024 TechRadar survey found that approximately a third of U.S. respondents now prefer AI tools for information gathering. The reasons are clear: AI delivers faster, more specific, and context-aware answers without the need to sift through multiple links. Users also appreciate the convenience, depth, and personalization AI offers — from summarizing complex topics to adapting responses based on individual preferences.

This signals a fundamental change in how people seek and interact with information online.

Key Findings of the Court

Here is a brief guide to some of the more noteworthy findings and their locations in the 230-page opinion.

Google’s Monopoly and Anticompetitive Conduct. The court reaffirmed its liability finding that Google violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by maintaining a monopoly in general search services and general search text advertising markets through exclusionary conduct. “Google is a monopolist, and it has acted as one to maintain its monopoly.” Google’s exclusive distribution agreements “froze the search ecosystem, resulting in markets in which Google has ‘no true competitor.’” (p. 1)

Market Foreclosure. Google’s agreements foreclosed a substantial portion of the general search services market, impairing rivals’ opportunities to compete. “Fifty percent of all queries in the United States are run through the default search access points covered by the challenged distribution agreements.” (p. 153)

Scale Advantage. Google’s exclusive agreements gave it access to scale that rivals could not match, enabling it to improve search quality and monetization. “Google receives nine times more queries each day than its rivals combined, and 19 times more on mobile.” (p. 49–50) “No current rival or nascent competitor can hope to compete against Google in the wider marketplace without access to meaningful scale, especially on mobile.” (p. 163)

Network Effects. Google’s dominance was reinforced by network effects, creating a flywheel of user data, quality improvements, and increased ad revenue. “More user data allows a GSE to improve search quality, better search quality attracts more users, and more users improve monetization.” (p. 161)

Anticompetitive Effects on Advertisers. Google’s practices, such as tweaking ad auctions and removing granular data from Search Query Reports, reduced advertisers’ autonomy and increased ad prices. “Google has increased text ads prices without fear of losing advertisers.” (p. 178)

Emergence of GenAI. GenAI technologies, such as ChatGPT and Perplexity, are a nascent competitive threat to Google’s dominance in search. “For the first time in over a decade, there is a genuine prospect that a product could emerge that will present a meaningful challenge to Google’s market dominance.” (p. 219)

Remedies to Restore Competition. The court adopted remedies to pry open the market, including prohibiting exclusive agreements, data-sharing requirements, and syndication of search results and ads. “Merely excising the exclusive provisions from Google’s distribution agreements will not unleash competition.” (p. 104) “Making data available to competitors would narrow the scale gap created by Google’s exclusive distribution agreements.” (p. 129)

Rejection of Structural Remedies. The court rejected Plaintiffs’ proposal to divest Chrome and Android, finding insufficient causal connection between Google’s ownership of these assets and its monopoly power. “The complete divestiture of Chrome is a poor fit for this case.” (p. 112) “Plaintiffs have not satisfied the stricter causal standard required to impose structural relief.” (p. 118)

Choice Screens Ineffectiveness. The court declined to impose choice screens, citing their ineffectiveness in Europe and the lack of competitive alternatives to Google. “Choice screens increase consumer surplus, but they barely move the needle in terms of market shares.” (p. 187)

Technical Committee. The court approved the establishment of a Technical Committee to assist in implementing and enforcing the judgment. “Its role is ‘to inform and assist the Government in its enforcement efforts.’” (p. 210)

Term of Final Judgment. The court set the term of the final judgment at six years, with an effective date 60 days after entry. “Technological advancement and product differentiation are what will change market dynamics, not a decade-long judicial decree.” (p. 219)

Conclusion

Judge Mehmet’s ruling marks a significant moment in ongoing efforts to foster fair competition in the tech industry. By imposing behavioral remedies while resisting sweeping structural changes, the decision attempts to chart a course that acknowledges Google’s entrenched dominance and embraces the potential for disruption from emerging technologies like generative AI, where Google is not exactly sitting on the sidelines. Whether these measures will change the search market or simply reinforce existing power structures is the question. If the story unfolds the way it did with Microsoft, the government and private litigants will be challenging Google’s dominance for years.

Download the opinion.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al v. GOOGLE LLC, 1_20-cv-03010, No. 1436 (D.D.C. Sep. 2, 2025)

Edited by Tom Hagy for Mogin Law LLP.