Remnant LLC v. Permico Royalties LLC, et al determined that a 90-year-old claim to ownership of a forfeited corporation was not valid.
The players
Hoffman: By most accounts a scoundrel and con man who plied his iniquitous trade during the Texas oil boom of the 1930’s. He was indicted for telling people he was the owner of Mid-Tex Corporation, holder of mineral interests in several counties. As Halloween approaches, know that his ghost will no longer haunt the oil patch.
Remnant: Successor-in-interest to Hoffman.
DeMotte: Former owner of Mid-Tex (charter forfeited in 1950).
Permico, Parkcrest and Roemer: Successors-in-interest to DeMotte.
The receiverships
1983: Receiver was appointed to represent former owners of Mid-Tex for execution of a mineral lease in Howard County. An order was entered approving a lease.
2016: Receivership in Glasscock County over Mid-Tex property. An order was entered approving a lease.
2020: Parkcrest and Roemer intervened in the Glasscock receivership claiming 48.4% of minerals through DeMotte as former owner of Mid-Tex. The ad litem had no notice of the hearing and did not attend. An order was entered that Parkcrest and Roemer were successors in interest to DeMotte’s share of Mid-Tex.
2021: Remnant filed a petition in the Glasscock receivership claiming to be the successor-in-interest to Hoffman. Permico (apparently a lessee) was accused of wrongfully asserting an adverse ownership interest in Mid-Tex.
The trial court granted summary judgment that Permico et al were successors-in-interrest to DeMotte as a former owner of Mid-Tex. Remnant appealed.
Res judicata and collateral estoppel
Ordinarily there can be only one final judgment in a lawsuit, but orders in receivership proceedings are an exception. Remnant complained that the order awarding partial ownership of Mid-Tex to Permico et al was not final because it failed to identify the remaining successors to Mid-Tex. However, Permico et al’s pleadings did not request determination of ownership of all successors of Mid-Tex. All they sought, and all they were granted, was confirmation of their particular interest.
Remnant maintained the because it was not a party or in privity with any party in the Glasscock receivership, Permico et al failed to satisfy this element of res judicata. The court agreed. Remnant was not in control of Permico et al’s actions at the time the judgment was rendered. Remnant was not a successor-in-interest to any party in Permico’s et al’s action.
Permico et al claimed that when they sued to determine their interest in Mid-Tex they “represented” the same interests Remnant now pursued because all of the parties derived their claim from Mid-Tex. That interpretation would effectively deprive Remnant of its right to due process under the 14th Amendment. Permico et al did not represent Remnant’s interest at the time they sought a declaration of their interests. Remnant wins on this point.
Permico et al also failed to demonstrate that the current dispute is based on the same claims that were at issue when the trial court resolved their petition.
The court also concluded that the present dispute involved facts that were not essential to the previous judgment and that the parties were not in privity. Collateral estoppel did not apply.
Regardless of all of that, summary judgment was proper because Remnant failed to submit eidence raising a fact issue that Hoffman owned Mid-Tex or that Mid-Tex was his alter ego.
For lawyers
The court discussed the hearsay objection to summary judgment evidence (p. 2-3), whether the judge in the Glasscock proceeding should have been disqualified for having an interest in the case (p. 7-8), and whether service by publication was effective (p. 7-8).
Your musical interlude
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