Affected organizations should take immediate action to assess the strength of their compliance frameworks in light of this enforcement development.
- The Whistleblower Rewards Program is implemented in partnership with the USPIS and USPS OIG and is intended to strengthen the DOJ’s ability to detect and prosecute both antitrust violations and related offenses.
- The new program establishes a new framework under which individuals can receive financial awards for voluntarily providing original information that leads to the successful resolution of antitrust or related criminal violations “affecting the Postal Service, its revenues, or property, to the person informing for the same.”
- In considering the new program, careful review should be given to the costs and benefits under the new program and the traditional Leniency Program, which has been a cornerstone of the Antitrust Division for decades.
The Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) on July 8, 2025, announced a new Whistleblower Rewards Program designed to uncover and prosecute anticompetitive conduct that harms consumers, taxpayers, and market competition, focused on postal-related operations and federal procurement. This is the first time the Antitrust Division has authorized financial rewards for whistleblowers—a significant shift considering the Division’s emphasis on the Leniency Program which was first established in 1978 and revised in 1993. The payment to reporting individuals may be made for up to 30 percent of a criminal fine of at least $1 million following a conviction or deferred or non-prosecution agreement. The new Whistleblower Rewards Program provides another avenue for individuals with credible, specific, and timely information to report.
The new program is implemented in partnership with the U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) and the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) and is intended to strengthen the DOJ’s ability to detect and prosecute both antitrust violations and related offenses. The Whistleblower Rewards Program is established under a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the three agencies. The program applies to conduct that directly or indirectly affects the Postal Service, targeting violations of law “affecting the Postal Service, its revenues, or property, to the person informing for the same.” 39 U.S.C. § 404(a)(7)).
How the Program Works: Structure, Eligibility, and Context
The Whistleblower Rewards Program establishes a new framework under which individuals can receive financial awards—ranging from 15 to 30 percent of collected criminal fines—for voluntarily providing original information that leads to the successful resolution of antitrust or related criminal violations. For an award to be granted, the tip must result in a criminal fine following a conviction of at least $1 million or an equivalent monetary recovery under a deferred or non-prosecution agreement. The Whistleblower Rewards Program is based on the statutory authority of the Postal Service to “collect and remit fines, penalties, and forfeitures arising out of matters affecting the Postal Service,” and “to pay one-half of all penalties and forfeitures imposed for violations of law affecting the Postal Service, its revenues, or property, to the person informing for the same.”
To qualify for consideration, whistleblowers must submit their reports voluntarily, meaning before receiving any formal legal obligation such as a subpoena. The information must be non-public, credible, and sufficiently specific, and must not already be known to the DOJ, USPS OIG, or USPIS. If the tip meets these criteria and leads to an eligible resolution, the DOJ will consult with USPS enforcement partners to determine an appropriate award amount, subject to statutory limits. The amount of the financial reward lies within the discretion of DOJ based on consideration of 10 factors.
Notably, whistleblowers do not need to be participants in the underlying conduct to qualify—this is a key distinction from the DOJ’s longstanding Leniency Program. Certain categories of privileged, coerced, or unlawfully obtained information are also excluded, though limited exceptions exist in cases involving imminent harm or misconduct suppression. Individuals employed by the DOJ, USPS, or law enforcement, as well as their close family members or household residents, are not eligible.
The new program builds on existing protections under the Criminal Antitrust Anti-Retaliation Act of 2020 (CAARA), which prohibits employer retaliation against employees who report suspected antitrust violations.[1] While CAARA provides important legal protections, it does not offer any monetary incentives. The Whistleblower Rewards Program fills the gap left by CAARA by pairing existing legal protections for whistleblowers with the opportunity to receive a financial reward.
The Risk of Significant Criminal Penalties for Antitrust Violations
Antitrust violations can result in substantial criminal penalties and treble civil damages for both companies and individuals, making early detection and proactive compliance essential.
The statutory maximum penalty for Sherman Act criminal convictions for corporations is up to $100 million and for individuals up to $1 million and up to 10 years’ imprisonment. However, under the Alternative Fines Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d), fines may reach twice the economic gain or loss associated with the violation. Under this statute, Sherman Act convictions have resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars in criminal fines imposed on corporations.
For example, the highest criminal fines, as reported by DOJ, have totaled $925 million, $650 million, and $550 million. Following a jury trial conviction, a liquid crystal display (LCD) company was sentenced to pay a $500 million criminal fine for its role in a conspiracy to fix the prices of thin-film transistor LCD panels. In that case, the court had the discretion to double the criminal fine under the Alternative Fines Act but concluded the fine imposed was sufficient. More than 30 other companies have paid criminal fines exceeding $100 million.
The Antitrust Division has also used criminal and civil enforcement tools to obtain criminal fines and civil damages involving the federal government. For example, in November 2018 three South Korean companies pled guilty to criminal charges and agreed to pay for their involvement in a decade-long bid rigging conspiracy targeting contracts to supply fuel to U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force bases in South Korea. Civil damages of $154 million were based on civil antitrust violations and the False Claims Act, a whistleblower statute first enacted in 1863.
Criminal convictions have resulted in lengthy prison terms, including:
- a 78-month prison term for a construction company owner who pled guilty to a bid-rigging and bribery scheme involving state agency improvement and repair contracts;
- five years in prison and a $25,000 criminal fine for a former president of a water freight carrier following a trial conviction in a conspiracy to fix rates and surcharges;
- a 41-month and 26-month prison terms for two executives following a trial conviction for conspiring to fix prices, rig bids, and allocate jobs for the sale of ready-mix concrete used in residential, commercial, and public projects;
- three-year prison terms and $200,000 criminal fines for a former company president and vice president for conspiring to fix the prices of thin-film transistor LCD panels following a trial conviction;
- a two-year prison term and $50,000 criminal fine for a former manager who conspired to rig bids, fix prices, and allocate market shares for sales of marine hose, based on charges filed under seal, his arrest in Germany, his extradition, and plea and sentence; and
- a two-year prison term and $50,000 criminal fine for a former senior manager for conspiring to fix the prices of thin-film transistor LCD panels after a trial conviction.
While prison terms can vary depending on sentencing factors determined by the court, the average prison term was 14 months from 2020–2024.
Collateral consequences from a criminal conviction may include civil damages actions and debarment. When the federal government or its agencies are victims of antitrust crime, the DOJ may obtain treble damages, as noted in the South Korean military contracts case above.
In addition, private parties (and state and local governments) can recover treble damages based on the antitrust violation, and they may use a successful federal prosecution and Sherman Act conviction as prima facie evidence against a defendant in a follow-on suit for treble damages Finally, a Sherman Act conviction may lead to suspension or debarment from doing business with the federal government. With the DOJ now incentivizing whistleblower reporting externally, the likelihood of an enforcement action—and exposure to these types of penalties—is significantly heightened.
Augmenting the Antitrust Division Leniency Program
While the DOJ’s Leniency Program has served as the Division’s flagship voluntary disclosure avenue for decades, the new Whistleblower Rewards Program introduces a new, complementary pathway for those without criminal exposure, expanding the opportunity for DOJ to identify, investigate, and develop criminal cases.
There are a few overlapping elements. Both programs exclude applicants who coerced another party to participate in the unlawful activity or were the leader or originator of that activity.[2] Both programs require early reporting. The Whistleblower Program requires a report before DOJ, USPIS, or OIG is “already aware” of the conduct, and “before a formal demand (e.g., grand jury subpoena) compelling the same individual’s testimony or compelling the production of documents.”[3] For Leniency, DOJ expects that the report be “prompt,” which is a key factor evaluated in determining whether to give leniency.[4] DOJ “encourages applicants to seek a marker at the first indication of possible wrongdoing,” but understands that an organization may conduct “a preliminary internal investigation in a timely fashion to confirm that it committed a violation before self-reporting.”
There are also some significant differences. The Leniency Program does not provide any financial reward. Instead, where the conditions are met, the Leniency Program provides a promise of non-prosecution for the criminal activity.
Only the first applicant to obtain a marker and satisfy the program’s conditions is eligible for leniency. The marker secures the first applicant’s place in a race for leniency, where only one party can qualify.[5] In contrast, multiple whistleblowers may be eligible to share in a financial reward under the Whistleblower Rewards Program.[6]
Most leniency applications to the Antitrust Division are made by companies for Corporate Leniency. While seldom used historically, Individual Leniency is available for individuals who self-report “their participation in illegal activity,” where “the Antitrust Division has not received information about the illegal activity from any other source,” and where the individual provides full cooperation, did not coerce others in the activity, and “clearly was not the leader or originator of that activity.”[7]
In contrast, the Whistleblower Rewards Program is open to third parties—including employees, contractors, or other observers—who are not required to have participated in the illegal activity. Further, some degree of involvement in the illegal activity does not necessarily disqualify a whistleblower, unless they were a leader or originator of the conduct.
Whistleblower reports may initially be made “anonymously through an attorney.”[8] The leniency program no longer recognizes this option.
While many whistleblower complaints are reported to the company—sometimes anonymously—there is a risk that the complaint may be reported to the government first and the company will only subsequently learn of a criminal investigation.
Depending on the particular facts, there are costs and benefits that should be carefully weighed before deciding to participate under either program.
Next Steps
The introduction of the Whistleblower Rewards Program creates new exposure risks for companies, particularly those that operate in industries where the USPS procures goods or services—either directly or indirectly. This includes not only vendors and contractors doing business with the USPS, but also participants in broader supply chains and regulated markets that may impact USPS operations or procurement. Organizations in these sectors should take immediate action to assess the strength of their compliance frameworks in light of this enforcement development.
First, companies should review and update their whistleblower policies to ensure they explicitly cover potential antitrust violations. Reporting channels should be accessible, anonymous, and well-communicated to employees at all levels. Internal policies should also reinforce non-retaliation commitments, particularly for those who raise concerns involving pricing, bidding, or competitive practices.
Second, compliance training programs should be updated to reflect the DOJ’s new enforcement posture, including updates to the recently revised Antitrust Compliance Guidelines.[9] Companies should consider whether and how to revise their compliance training programs in light of the new Rewards Program and existing Leniency Program. For example, the Antitrust Division Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs in Criminal Antitrust Investigations asks whether non-disclosure agreements are “utilized or enforced in such a way that they act to deter whistleblowers or violate CAARA?”
Companies should consider conducting targeted compliance audits, especially in areas tied to public-sector contracts or regulated markets. This includes evaluating whether internal reporting and escalation procedures are effective, whether privileged information is being properly safeguarded, and whether prior internal disclosures could now present a risk of external reporting. Where appropriate, legal counsel should be consulted to determine whether voluntary disclosure under the Leniency Program may still be viable.
Finally, given the significant penalties and varied factual circumstances that may apply, companies can benefit from seeking legal guidance on the operation of both programs, how each program applies to a company’s specific circumstances, and the effectiveness of their compliance and whistleblower programs. Periodic objective review of the compliance and whistleblower functions will best allow companies to detect, address, and remediate potential criminal violations.
Taking these steps now can help organizations mitigate the risk of whistleblower-driven investigations and ensure they remain on the front foot in a shifting antitrust enforcement landscape. More importantly, once an antitrust investigation commences, eligibility for the Leniency Program or to address whistleblower reports may be too late.
[1] See Mark L. Krotoski & Bernard W. Archbold, Double-Check Whistleblower Programs to Prep for Antitrust Anti-Retaliation Act, Bloomberg Law (Jan. 7, 2021) (reviewing protections under the statute); see also Mark L. Krotoski & Bernard W. Archbold, Prospects Improve for Enactment of the Criminal Antitrust Anti-Retaliation Act of 2019, Competition Policy International (Dec. 15, 2019) (providing a detailed explanation of the act’s administrative review framework and available remedies).
[2] MOU IV(A)(1)(a)(i); Justice Manual § 7-3.310(6) (Type A Corporate Leniency); Justice Manual § 7-3.320(6) (Type B Corporate Leniency); Justice Manual § 7-3.330(3) (Individual Leniency); see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Frequently Asked Questions 16, 27 (Jan. 3, 2023).
[3] MOU III(B), IV(A)(2)(a).
[4] FAQ 22 (Jan. 3, 2023).
[5] FAQ 2 (Jan. 3, 2023) (“Organizations are in a race with their co-conspirators” and “individuals are in a race with one another—both others at their employer and those at other organizations participating in the conspiracy.”).
[6] MOU IV(B); see also MOU III(B).
[7] Justice Manual § 7-3.330(3) (Individual Leniency).
[8] MOU IV(A)(1)(a). In 2017 and 2008, initial anonymous applications for leniency could be made. See FAQ 2 n.6 (Jan. 26, 2017); FAQ 2 n.6 (Nov. 19, 2008). However, this guidance allowing an initial anonymous leniency application has been removed in the current FAQ.
[9] See also M. Krotoski, Landmark Antitrust Division Policy to Incentivize Corporate Compliance and Mitigate Antitrust Risk, Bloomberg Law (Oct. 2019) (summarizing elements of antitrust compliance programs based on new DOJ standards).
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