[co-author: Zachariah Chen]
The recent conviction of London-based art dealer Oghenochuko Ojiri marks a watershed moment for financial crime enforcement in the UK's regulated sector. For the first time, a conviction has been secured under section 21A of the Terrorism Act 2000, which criminalises the failure to disclose knowledge or suspicion of terrorist financing in the regulated sector. The case offers a stark warning to professionals across high-risk industries about the consequences of inadequate due diligence and wilful blindness.
Art market as a regulated sector
The UK art market has operated under increasing regulatory scrutiny in recent years. Since January 2020, art market participants (AMPs) have fallen within the scope of the regulated sector under the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) Regulations 2019 (MLRs). AMPs include individuals or firms dealing in high-value works of art (EUR 10,000 or more), such as dealers, auction houses and intermediaries. The MLRs require these entities to perform formal customer due diligence (CDD) to mitigate money laundering and terrorist financing risks and to meet various other compliance obligations.
It is also worth noting that "works of art" are defined broadly under the MLRs – encompassing hand-executed paintings, drawings, collages, decorative plaques, engravings, lithographs, prints, sculptures or statuaries, tapestries, ceramics, enamels and photographs. As a result, anti-money laundering (AML) obligations apply across a wide range of business activities in the art world, capturing smaller firms, art advisers and financiers, and art storage facilities alike. The intention is to embed day-to-day vigilance and risk awareness in a market long associated with discretion and informality – a shift that demands both cultural and procedural adjustment.
This evolving compliance landscape makes the recent conviction of Ojiri all the more significant – and instructive.
A first-of-its-kind prosecution
Ojiri – a former BBC antiques presenter and director of the Ramp Gallery in London – pleaded guilty to eight offences under section 21A of the Terrorism Act 2000, and was sentenced in June 2025 to two years and six months' imprisonment.
Section 21A requires those in the regulated sector to make a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) where, in the course of business, they know, suspect, or have reasonable grounds to suspect that someone is funding terrorism or using assets for terrorist purposes. Whether a failure to report amounts to a criminal offence may depend in part on whether the person followed Treasury-approved guidance – such as the British Art Market Federation’s Guidance on Anti-Money Laundering for UK Art Market Participants (the "BAMF Guidance"). Failure to disclose is punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment.
In Ojiri’s case, the offences related to a series of artwork sales between October 2020 and December 2021 to Nazem Ahmad, a sanctioned Lebanese collector suspected of financing Hezbollah. At the time of the transactions, Ahmad was subject to US counter-terrorism designations and had been flagged in UK media coverage. Having read a detailed New York Times report in December 2019, Ojiri was aware of Ahmad’s suspected links to terrorist financing, including that Ahmad used wealth, including in the form of art, to launder money and finance terrorism. Despite this, he engaged in repeated transactions with Ahmad totalling nearly £140,000 – disguising the true purchaser’s identity in invoices, using aliases in contact records and accepting identification documents that he knew to be false.
The court found that Ojiri knowingly obscured the true source of funds he received and actively circumvented compliance safeguards, including by disguising Ahmad’s identity, ignoring red flags and manipulating records. Mrs Justice Cheema-Grubb concluded that Ojiri had acted with actual suspicion "close to knowledge", and had made a deliberate decision to prioritise financial and reputational gain over his obligations as a regulated professional.
Legal complexity and compliance gaps
While AMPs are now within the scope of both AML and financial sanctions regimes, risk assessment and implementation of risk mitigation systems and controls vary widely across the sector.
In Ojiri’s case, the compliance failures were stark. Among his missteps were:
- Accepting false buyer identities without challenge;
- Failing to file SARs, despite being trained in how to do so;
- Ignoring amber flags raised by risk monitoring tools;
- Recording Ahmad’s contact under an alias on his phone; and
- Invoicing a front company while sending copies bearing Ahmad’s name directly to him.
The court found that Ojiri had "firmly believed" he was dealing with a terrorism financier – and instead of filing an SAR, he elected to continue the relationship and continue transacting.
Sanctions compliance
This case also underscores the increasingly interconnected nature of regulatory obligations facing the art market. Alongside AML and counter-terrorist financing rules, financial sanctions have emerged as a parallel area carrying significant risk.
In January 2024, an amber alert on UK artwork storage facilities and specialist service providers linked to the art storage sector was jointly issued by the NCA, OFSI and HMRC. This alert was devised to raise risk awareness among businesses involved in holding, storing or moving artworks (such as warehouses, auction houses, art dealerships, galleries and museums), as well as those companies providing services to the art storage sector (such as shipping companies, insurers, agents and brokers, lawyers, accountants and banking providers).
On 14 May 2025, art dealers and those storing high-value artworks became "relevant firms" under the UK financial sanctions regime. They are now subject to mandatory reporting obligations if they know or suspect they are dealing with a designated person – including clients, counterparties or ultimate beneficial owners – or become aware of a sanctions breach in the course of their business.
OFSI's Financial Sanctions Guidance for High Value Dealers & Art Market Participants (the "OFSI Guidance")1 , updated in March 2025, highlights the sector’s vulnerability to abuse. Common risks include the use of intermediaries, offshore structures, forged provenance and intentionally vague payment arrangements – all of which were features in the Ojiri case. The OFSI Guidance stresses the importance of enhanced due diligence, screening against the consolidated sanctions list, and proper scrutiny of ownership and control structures.
Professionals in the sector should also be alert to OFSI’s emphasis on storage-related risks, particularly when artworks are held "on commission" or for transfer overseas – a practice that was central to the case study in the OFSI Guidance and which mirrored Ojiri’s own arrangement with Ahmad, who had artworks shipped to Dubai and Lebanon.
Implications for compliance professionals
The Ojiri case reflects a growing trend towards holding professionals accountable not only for what they do, but for what they fail to disclose. Non-disclosure offences under section 21A may increasingly be seen by enforcement authorities as a frontline tool to address the role of "gatekeepers" in the movement of illicit finance.
In light of this, regulated firms – particularly in the art (including art storage), luxury goods and asset warehousing sectors – should take practical steps to strengthen controls:
- Registration: AMPs must register with HMRC before carrying out business.
- Regular risk assessment and CDD: Risk assessments and CDD must be performed regularly to account for changes in counterparties' circumstances. Enhanced CDD must be performed for clients from high-risk jurisdictions or with opaque corporate structures. A comprehensive record of CDD performed and transactions must be maintained.
- Policies and procedures:
- Review and update regularly;
- Ensure their effective implementation; and
- Consult the BAMF Guidance.
- Nominated officer: A nominated officer must be appointed.
- Suspicion escalation and reporting: Ensure internal policies clearly spell out how and when to escalate a concern. Suspicious transactions must be reported to the NCA as soon as practicable.
- Sanctions screening and verification: Regularly review client lists against the UK consolidated list and understand ownership/control links. This includes counterparties in complex supply chains or overseas entities.
- Training and governance: Refresh staff training to include the OFSI Guidance and examples from recent cases – including Ojiri – to make the risks tangible.
- Use your tools: Compliance platforms and advisory services only help if their outputs are taken seriously. Ignoring red or amber flags or circumventing due diligence systems can be evidence of culpability.
- Understand the consequences of non-compliance: Failure to comply with the MLRs may lead to criminal prosecution or civil penalties.
Final reflections: a warning shot
The Ojiri case is significant not only because it breaks new legal ground, but because of what it signals more broadly. It reflects a more assertive enforcement stance, a greater willingness to target professionals who enable illicit finance and a clear message from both UK enforcement agencies and the courts: gatekeepers must be vigilant and take responsibility.
In the art world – and other parts of the regulated sector – the lesson is clear: due diligence is not optional, and compliance blind spots will no longer be tolerated.
References
- The OFSI Guidance provides financial sanctions guidance for entities and individuals that operate in the sale or trade of high value goods, especially those trading internationally with regions that may be subject to UK financial sanctions restrictions.
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