Court: United States District Court for the Central District of California
In this action, plaintiff Sondra Scott alleges asbestos exposure from her personal use of various talcum powder products including, but not limited to, Cashmere Bouquet, from approximately 1960 until 2020.
Mrs. Scott further claims bystander asbestos exposure because of the use of talcum powder products by her spouse, per quod plaintiff Richard Scott, during the same timeframe. On September 23, 2024, Mrs. Scott alleges to have developed malignant mesothelioma because of the purported asbestos exposure.
On or about February 25, Mr. and Mrs. Scott (collectively hereinafter, “plaintiffs”), initiated this action by filing a complaint with the Los Angeles County Superior Court naming various manufacturers of the claimed talcum powder products including, but not limited to: Colgate-Palmolive Company, Chanel, Inc. (Chanel), Christian Dior Perfumes LLC, among others as defendants. Plaintiffs’ complaint seeks damages under causes of action for negligence, strict liability and loss of consortium, among other claims.
Plaintiffs subsequently agreed to settlements “in principle” with Chanel and Christian Dior. Thereafter, on July 30, defendants removed the action to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (which generally governs removal) and 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (which describes procedures for removal). Then on August 7, plaintiffs filed an ex parte application to remand this action to the Los Angeles Superior Court by claiming removal was improper. Defendants opposed plaintiffs’ application to remand.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and, as such, “have an independent obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 501 (2006) (citing Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999)). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised sua sponte by the district court at any point in the litigation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 583. “When a civil action is removed solely under section 1441(a), all defendants who have been properly joined and served must join in or consent to the removal of the action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A). However, “the ‘rule of unanimity’ does not apply to ‘nominal, unknown or fraudulently joined parties.'” United Computer Sys., Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 298 F.3d 756, 762 (9th Cir. 2002). For the purposes of necessity of joining in removal, “[a] defendant is a nominal party where his role is limited to that of a stakeholder or depositary.” Hewitt v. City of Stanton, 798 F. 2d 1230, 12333 (9th Cir. 1986). To be “[n]ominal means simply a party having no immediately apparent stake in the litigation either prior or subsequent to the act of removal.” Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 736 F.3d 255, 260 (4th Cir. 2013).
Defendants contend that because plaintiffs settled with Chanel and Christian Dior “these defendants do not have a real interest in the litigation” and therefore “are nominal defendants, and their joinder or consent is no longer proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446 for removal of civil actions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.”
Defendants’ argument was unavailing. The federal court instead found plaintiffs have only agreed “in principle” to settlement terms with Chanel and Christian Dior. However, there were no binding written agreements signed by any of the parties, claims have not yet been released, and no payment is due or has been rendered. Chanel and Christian Dior are therefore not nominal parties. Id. As such, the consent of Chanel and Christian Dior was necessary for removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Yet there was no proof of any such consent. Id.
In view of the above, the federal court held it lacks subject matter jurisdiction and remand is proper. Id. Consequently, the federal court granted plaintiffs’ ex parte application and remanded the action to the state court.
Read the full decision here.