J.L., et. al. v. Lower Merion School District, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209674 (E.D. Pa. November 19, 2024) (A parent did not sufficiently allege an associational discrimination claim stemming from a school district’s discrimination against her autistic son)
BACKGROUND
Alex Le Pape, a student at Lower Merion School District (“District”) since 2006, was diagnosed with autism as a child and identifies as a non-speaker. In tenth grade, Alex began communicating using the “spelling to communicate” method, in which he would point to letters on a letter-board held by a communication support person.
Initially, the District did not allow Alex to utilize a letter-board in class but later granted him permission. The District did not, however, provide him with a trained communication support person. Alex’s mother then sought permission from the District to serve as his communication partner during class and extracurricular activities. She reduced her work schedule in order to do so.
The District initially agreed to this arrangement. Over the next few years, however, there was back-and-forth between Alex’s parents and the District about who would serve as Alex’s communication partner and whether his individualized education plan (“IEP”) should be revised. Eventually, in 2018, the District decided that Alex should not be allowed to use a letter-board in class at all. Thereafter, Alex’s parents began homeschooling him.
The District later revised his IEP to allow him to use a letter-board but again did not agree to fund a communication support person. Alex’s parents did not return him to school. In order to homeschool Alex, his mother took a leave of absence, paid for her own health insurance, and continued with a reduced work schedule. She was unable to return to her normal work schedule, and her salary was reduced.
Alex’s parents subsequently sued the District for intentional discrimination against Alex as well as associational discrimination against themselves. Following a remand from the Third Circuit on other issues, the District moved to dismiss all the claims. After oral argument, the Eastern District denied the District’s motions as to the intentional discrimination claims but reserved judgment on the associational discrimination claims for the mother. (The Plaintiffs conceded at oral argument that no such claim existed for the father.)
DISCUSSION
The District set forth two arguments in support of its motion: (1) the Plaintiffs did not plead any associational discrimination claim in their Amended Complaint and were foreclosed from doing so at this stage; and (2) even if the claims had been properly pled, the Plaintiffs failed to set forth facts establishing that the District discriminated against Alex’s mother. The Court, ultimately, agreed with both of the District’s arguments and granted the District’s motion.
The Plaintiffs argued that they need not plead such a claim in their Amended Complaint and that the mother’s associational discrimination claims were instead based on evidence in the record. The Court disagreed, citing a plethora of caselaw holding that a plaintiff may not amend its complaint in response to a motion for summary judgment. Further, the Court rejected the idea that the mother’s associational discrimination claims served as a constructive motion to amend the Amended Complaint to include these claims. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs’ failure to plead these claims warranted summary judgment in favor of the District.
The Court also held that, even if these claims were properly pled, the mother did not suffer any direct injury from the District’s associational discrimination. In order to succeed on an associational discrimination claim, the mother must have suffered a direct injury from the District’s discrimination against her. Here, however, there was no evidence that the mother’s lost wages and health insurance coverage stemmed from the District’s treatment of her. Instead, these injuries stemmed from the District’s treatment of Alex. Therefore, the mother’s derivative injuries could not form the basis of an associational discrimination claim.
PRACTICAL ADVICE
In J.L., the District and Alex’s parents engaged in significant back-and-forth regarding Alex’s IEP and an appropriate communication support person. The District repeatedly changed course and reneged on promises made to the parents. Thus, one lesson from the J.L. decision is that school districts need to work effectively with parents in formulating an IEP that is satisfactory to all parties in order to avoid costly litigation. Additionally, the J.L. opinion shows that parents of disabled students can sue for associational discrimination, and school districts need to be mindful that such claims may arise.
