On June 11, 2024, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ (United States Soccer Federation, Inc. (“U.S. Soccer”) and Major League Soccer, LLC (“MLS”)) motions for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s (North American Soccer League, LLC (“NASL”)) claim that Defendants conspired to exclude it from competing in the men’s professional soccer leagues in the U.S. and Canada in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court reasoned that a reasonable jury could find that Defendants acted in concert or unilaterally in applying the professional soccer league standards in a discriminatory manner and allowed that issue and Plaintiff’s monopolization claims to go forward to trial.
First, the Court considered whether there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the Defendants’ standards, in and of themselves, violated Section 1 and concluded there was not. Instead, the Court held that “standards-setting provides procompetitive benefits to many industries (especially professional sports).” Notably, Plaintiff did not attempt to explain what antitrust injury the standards, standing alone, caused. Therefore, the Court held that Plaintiff lacked antitrust standing to bring this claim and granted Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on it.
Second, the Court considered whether there was sufficient evidence that the method of enforcing the standards (most notably its denial of NASL’s accreditation and grant of waivers to MLS) nevertheless caused antitrust injury. On this question, the Court held the parties’ competing evidence on the application of the standards created issues of material fact ripe for a jury. For example, the Court concluded there were disputed facts regarding Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant began stricter enforcement and heightening of the standards at the time Plaintiff’s league formed in order to exclude Plaintiff, while cautioning that “temporal proximity does not always indicate causation.”
Importantly, this case presents an example where circumstantial evidence was sufficient to create fact issues to survive summary judgment. Responding to the Defendants’ argument that there was a lack of documents to reflect any unlawful agreement, the Court explained, “the whole point of circumstantial evidence” is that “unlawful conspirators rarely commit their plans to writing.” However, the Court held that at trial, Plaintiff will need to convince a jury the motivation of U.S. Soccer’s actions was to preclude Plaintiff’s participation rather than some independent and legitimate reason.
Separately, Plaintiff asserted claims under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits firms from monopolizing or attempting to monopolize commerce. The Court held that these claims would proceed to trial since “Section 2 claims rise and fall with its Section 1 claims.” Since the Court’s June 11, 2024 Order did not substantively address these issues, MLS has asked the Court to reconsider its motion for summary judgement on Count III (Plaintiff’s Section 2 conspiracy claims), and that request is pending.
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