Summary of Key Developments — May/June 2025
The "European Antitrust Bimonthly Bulletin" breaks down the major antitrust developments in Europe during the past two months into concise and actionable takeaways. For any questions or suggestions please contact Jindrich Kloub, Deirdre Carroll, or any other attorney in the European Antitrust Team listed at the end of the Bulletin.
Advocate General (AG) Delivers Advisory Opinions in Sports Cases
On May 15, 2025, AG Emiliou delivered advisory opinions in three separate sports association cases referred for a preliminary ruling to the EU’s highest court, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), with potential relevance to price/wage and no-poach agreements generally. The first two cases involve litigation between soccer associations and sports agents referred to the ECJ by separate German courts. In RRC Sports (Case C-209/23), the AG considered whether rules governing football agents’ fees amount to a potential restriction of competition “by object.” He found that while the rules introduce a mechanism which affects the calculation of the maximum rate of fees that can be charged by agents for certain types of service, they cannot be easily considered by object restrictions because they do not set any specific binding maximum level of fees.
In Rogon (Case C-133/24), the AG considered whether rules on using players’ agents could be justified. The AG suggested to the ECJ that the so-called “sporting exception” under EU competition law should apply to regulations of a sports association concerning services provided on markets either upstream or downstream of the association’s activities, as long as these services are capable of having a direct and significant influence on the association’s core activities. While associations may have some margin of appreciation, the assessment should take into account how proximate or distant the association’s activity and the affected third-party activities are.
In Tondela (Case C-133/24), the AG considered that while no-poach agreements belong to a category of agreements that is typically restrictive of competition, they have to be assessed in their legal and economic context, including their objectives. In the case at hand, which concerns an appeal against the decision of the Portuguese competition authority imposing fines of €11.3 million (approximately US$12 million) on football clubs for an alleged agreement not to hire football players from other clubs who unilaterally terminated their employment contracts, the AG recommends that the no-poach agreement should not be considered a restriction by object if its genuine rationale was to preserve the fairness and integrity of the sports competition affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.
The ECJ is not bound by the AG’s opinions and will provide rulings at a later date, on which the referring national courts will base their respective judgments.
The AG’s opinions, if followed by the ECJ, would continue a line of recent ECJ cases such as SuperBock and Budapest Bank, emphasizing the need to consider the legal and economic context of agreements when determining whether they have the object of restricting competition, which is a concept that must be interpreted strictly.
European Commission (EC) Sanctions Cartel Facilitated by a Minority Stake in a Competitor
On June 2, 2025, the EC announced that it had fined food delivery companies Delivery Hero and Glovo a total of €329 million for participating in a cartel in the online food delivery sector. According to the EC, the companies leveraged Delivery Hero’s minority stake in Glovo and i) agreed not to poach each other’s employees, ii) exchanged commercially sensitive information, and iii) allocated geographic markets. Glovo’s fine was set at the statutory maximum, and both received a 10 percent fine reduction for acknowledging their participation in the cartel and agreeing to settle the case. The EC fined Delivery Hero €223.285 million (approximately US$257.8 million), and Glovo €105.732 million (approximately US$122.1 million). This decision is groundbreaking, as it marks the EC’s first finding of a cartel in the labor market (no-poach agreement) and the first instance of the EC finding that cartel conduct was facilitated by a minority stake in a rival company.
The EC stated that, starting from Delivery Hero’s first acquisition of a minority shareholding in Glovo in July 2018, and until July 2022, the companies progressively removed competitive constraints between them and replaced competition with multilayered anticompetitive coordination. For instance, initial reciprocal no-hire clauses for certain employees were quickly broadened to cover all employees except for delivery drivers/riders. For more information, see the Wilson Sonsini alert.
Companies with minority stakes in competitors, and in particular those that come with board representation, should take appropriate measures to prevent them from being used to share competitively sensitive information or to coordinate the companies’ commercial conduct.
France Fines Tech Consultancies in Labor Cartel Investigation
On June 11, 2025, the French Competition Authority (FCA) announced that it had sanctioned two separate no-poach agreements between Ausy (now Randstad Digital) and Alten, on the one hand, and Expleo and Bertrandt, on the other. These companies are active in the engineering, technology consulting, and IT services sectors. The FCA imposed fines totaling €29.5 million (approximately US$34.1 million), with Alten being fined €24 million (approximately US$27.7 million), Bertrandt €3.6 million (approximately US$4.2 million), Expleo €1.9 million (approximately US$2.2 million), and Ausy receiving immunity from fines due to having alerted the FCA.
The agreement between Ausy and Alten was in place between 2007 and 2016 and prohibited the companies from poaching and hiring business managers, and also required the companies to consult each other when moves were planned. The agreement between Bertrandt and Expleo was in place between February and September 2018 and prohibited the companies from poaching and generally hiring each other’s employees. The FCA closed its investigation regarding a third agreement between Ausy and another company, finding that there was insufficient evidence of a “non-aggression pact” between the companies concerning their employees. The FCA also closed an investigation into non-solicitation clauses in partnership contracts between several of the companies, finding that these clauses did not have an anticompetitive purpose, and that there was insufficient evidence of anticompetitive effects.
Companies should be aware that exchanging competitively sensitive information poses a risk under competition laws in Europe and that antitrust regulators in Europe are increasingly targeting employee no-poach agreements and are closely scrutinizing non-solicitation clauses. Companies should review their compliance policies to ensure they are up to date and appropriately focus on risks arising out of improper information sharing and agreements relating to the hiring of employees.
Association Files Complaint with EC Against Broadcom’s Licensing Practices
On May 7, 2025, VOICE, an association of German IT managers, filed (in German) a formal complaint with the EC against Broadcom. VOICE alleges that following its acquisition of VMware, Broadcom has abused its dominance in the market for virtualization software by arbitrarily bundling products and imposing “exorbitant and unfair” price increases upon its customers. VOICE also claims that Broadcom prevents customers from switching to other virtualization software providers or that they can only do so at the cost of significant expenditures.
Companies should be aware that market conduct by leading firms is subject to close scrutiny by European competition regulators, who frequently investigate practices such as bundling, exclusivity arrangements, pricing strategies, self-preferencing, discriminatory conduct, and other potentially anti-competitive behavior. We have extensive experience both defending companies in such investigations and representing complainants or third parties.
EC Market Tested Proposed Commitments in Microsoft Teams Investigation
On May 16, 2025, the EC invited public comments on commitments offered by Microsoft to address competition concerns over allegedly tying its communication and collaboration product Microsoft Teams to its suites of productivity applications for businesses Office 365 and Microsoft 365. Under the proposed commitments, Microsoft would i) make available versions of these suites without Teams and at a reduced price; ii) allow customers to switch to suites without Teams, including in the framework of existing contracts; iii) offer Teams’s competitors increased interoperability with other Microsoft products; and iv) allow customers to move their data out of Teams to facilitate the use of competing products.
While the commitments would only apply within the European Economic Area, Microsoft stated that if the commitments are made binding, it would align its worldwide suite offers and pricing with the commitments. The commitments offered by Microsoft would remain in force for seven years, except for interoperability and data portability obligations which would remain in force for 10 years. The market test concluded on June 16, 2025. The EC is now evaluating market feedback before deciding whether to accept the commitments and stop the investigation.
Companies should consider whether they are facing any barriers because of conduct by dominant or incumbent firms in Europe. We can assist in identifying possible opportunities and formulating the appropriate strategy for obtaining relief. Equally, we can assist with defending against such claims.
AG Advisory Opinion Recommends Confirming Google Android Judgment
On June 19, 2025, AG Kokott delivered an advisory opinion to the ECJ, recommending that the judgment of the EU’s court of first instance, the General Court, should stand. In July 2018, the EC had fined Google €4.343 billion (approx. US$5.01 billion) for allegedly abusing its dominant position by imposing anticompetitive contractual restrictions on manufacturers of mobile devices and on mobile network operators. The EC claimed that i) Google only licensed its app store Play Store in a bundle together with the Chrome browser and the Google Search app, ii) that manufacturers had to agree not to sell mobile devices with versions of the Android operating system not authorized by Google, and iii) that Google provided a share of its advertising revenues to manufacturers and network operators under the condition that they did not preinstall another general search service on any device within an agreed portfolio.
Google challenged this decision before the GC, which annulled only the revenue sharing aspect of the decision, reducing the fine to €4.124 billion (approx. US$4.76 billion). The AG’s opinion is non-binding, and the ECJ will issue its judgment at a later time.
Companies should know that the EC is closely scrutinizing exclusivity and bundling practices, particularly if engaged in by large companies in the digital sector. We can assist with defending against such claims.
UK Appeals Court Reinstates Excessive Pricing Fines in Pharma Case
On May 8, 2025, the UK Court of Appeal ruled in favor of the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) in a case about excessive pricing for the thyroid drug liothyronine. Between 2009 and 2017, Advanz, the sole supplier of liothyronine tablets in the UK, increased the price it charged by more than 1,110 percent. In 2021, the CMA fined Advanz and the two former owners, HgCapital and Cinven, a combined £101.4 million (approximately US$137 million). In 2023, the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) upheld the CMA’s findings, but reduced the fines for the two former owners. Cinven chose to appeal this ruling further, while HgCapital agreed to pay the fine and not engage in appeals. The Court of Appeal denied Cinven permission to appeal further and ruled that its original fine of £51.9 million (approximately US$70.2 million) should be reinstated.
Companies should know that European competition authorities closely observe price increases in the pharmaceutical sector, with the UK’s CMA alone imposing fines in five excessive pricing cases including this one in the pharmaceutical sector in the past six years.
Germany Sends Statement of Objections to Amazon over Price Control Mechanisms
On June 2, 2025, Germany’s Federal Cartel Office (FCO) announced that it had sent formal charges (a Statement of Objections, or SO) to Amazon regarding its price control mechanisms for third-party sellers on its platform. The FCO claimed that Amazon’s algorithms calculate constantly changing, dynamic maximum prices for products, and compare these with the offerings of third parties. If a price is judged to be too high and the price is qualified as a “price mistake,” then Amazon delists the third-party offering from its marketplace. If a listing is placed in the categories of “too high price” or “uncompetitive price,” then the listing is removed from the “Buy Box,” or it may be ranked lower in the search results list, or it may become ineligible to be advertised on Amazon marketplace. If no product is priced conforming to Amazon’s maximum price, then Amazon sends a request to the traders to adjust their prices to conform with the prices that Amazon believes are appropriate.
The SO is based both on a potential infringement of the general abuse prohibition of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and on the special abuse control provisions for designated large digital companies under Section 19a of the German Competition Act. The FCO designated Amazon under Section 19a in July 2022, which the German Supreme Court upheld in April 2024.
Competition agencies in the EU remain focused on the digital sector and in a number of countries they have been given additional powers under new digital sector regulations such as the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the German Section 19a, or the UK’s Digital Markets, Competition, and Consumers (DMCC) Act. We can assist in identifying and minimizing potential areas of risk. Equally, we can assist in identifying possible opportunities and formulating the appropriate strategy for obtaining relief.
Spain to Investigate Football Association UEFA over Organization of European Football Competitions
On June 6, 2025, Spain’s competition authority CNMC announced that it had initiated an investigation into the football association UEFA over the suspicion that it may have restricted competition in the organization of football competitions in Europe, acting upon the complaint of private company A22. In April 2021, A22 had announced a proposal for a seasonal football competition for elite European football clubs called “European Super League.” After public backlash, including UEFA announcing that it could exclude participating teams from its competitions and/or impose various measures on them, nine clubs announced that they would not consider participating in the European Super League.
The CNMC must conclude its investigation within 24 months.
Companies should be aware that market conduct by leading firms is subject to close scrutiny by European competition regulators, who frequently investigate practices such as bundling, exclusivity arrangements, pricing strategies, self-preferencing, discriminatory conduct, and other potentially anti-competitive behavior. We have extensive experience both defending companies in such investigations and representing complainants or third parties.
Apple Appeals French Fine over Allegedly Discriminatory App Tracking Transparency (ATT) Framework
On June 12, 2025, France’s FCA informed (in French) that Apple had filed a court appeal against the FCA’s decision of March 31, 2025, fining Apple €150 million (approx. US$170 million). The FCA alleged that Apple had abused its dominant position in the market for the distribution of mobile applications on iOS and iPadOS devices between April 2021 and July 2023 by implementing discriminatory practices linked to its ATT framework. The ATT framework introduced a requirement for app developers to request users’ consent before collecting their data and tracking their activity for advertising purposes. While third parties needed to collect opt-in consent to collect user data for targeted advertising purposes, Apple was able to collect user data to deliver targeted ads using a more permissive opt-out mechanism.
Companies should consider that competition authorities in the EU are focusing on potentially discriminatory practices by dominant firms, particularly in the digital sector. We can assist in reviewing existing business practices to minimize risk. Equally, we can assist in identifying possible opportunities for companies facing discrimination by their business partners and formulating the appropriate strategy for obtaining relief.
UK CMA Proposes to Designate Google with “Strategic Market Status” (SMS)
On June 24, 2025, the CMA announced that it was proposing to designate Google as having SMS in relation to general search and search advertising under the UK’s new digital markets regime established by the DMCC Act. Under the DMCC, large tech platforms may be designated as having SMS and have tailored conduct requirements imposed on them. The CMA’s proposed SMS designation would include AI-based search features, though not the Gemini AI Assistant itself. The CMA proposed taking priority measures after a designation decision, including i) requiring choice screens to help users select between search services, ii) ensuring fair and nondiscriminatory ranking of search results, and iii) more transparency and control for publishers whose content appears in search results. The CMA is considering a second group of measures starting in the first half of 2026. These would include addressing Google’s bargaining position towards publishers, competing specialized search services, and transparency issues regarding search advertising.
The CMA is inviting public comment on its proposed decision until July 22, 2025. The CMA will make a final decision on SMS designation by the deadline of October 13, 2025. If Google is designated, the CMA would consult on a first set of measures shortly afterwards. The CMA expressly noted that if it designated Google as having SMS this would not imply that Google has engaged in any kind of anticompetitive conduct. The CMA stated that it anticipated deciding only in early 2026 on whether to open additional SMS designation investigations.
Companies should know that the UK now has a digital regime under which it may impose individually tailored conduct requirements on large tech platforms. We can assist with DMCC compliance or assessing third-party intervention opportunities.
EC Chief Competition Economist Outlines Theories of Harm in AI
On May 15, 2025, Emanuele Tarantino, the chief economist of the EC’s competition arm DG COMP, addressed a conference on the issue of theories of harm within the AI sector. The chief economist described markets within the AI supply chain as oligopolistic and stated that enforcers should acknowledge the presence of conglomerates and how they can entrench their market power from one market to another. He noted as well that enforcers should not just narrowly think about whether using AI can result in economic efficiencies for a company. Instead, they should take into account broader issues such as the effects of AI uptake on wages and company layoffs as well as risks to societal cohesion and consumer safety from potentially divisive or harmful AI models.
Companies should know that European competition agencies are closely watching developments in the Generative AI space, including investments in and partnerships with companies developing AI models. Companies should carefully consider the impacts of partnerships on competition and how they communicate about them.
National Agencies Interested in Pricing Algorithms and Algorithmic Collusion
On May 8, 2025, the head of the Portuguese Competition Authority (AdC) told an antitrust conference that it was monitoring for any signs of collusion using pricing algorithms. The AdC carried out surveys in Portugal and also sent requests for information to more than 200 algorithm developers worldwide, asking which Portuguese sectors and firms they were supplying. The AdC’s chair shared his concern that AI-powered pricing algorithms could speed up algorithm collusion and increase the likelihood of setting prices in a way that mimics collusive outcomes.
On May 28, 2025, the head of Spain’s competition authority CNMC, Cani Fernández, told a podcast that the CNMC had developed an AI tool called “Brava” to detect bid-rigging, and was now working to extend the capabilities of Brava to detect algorithmic collusion as well. Fernández added that the CNMC had shared Brava’s basic code with other competition authorities, so that they could train it with their own data and utilize it in their enforcement efforts.
On June 20, 2025, the UK’s CMA published a paper setting out its concerns about dynamic pricing. The CMA noted that dynamic pricing can be consistent with effective competition and good outcomes for consumers. On the other hand, the CMA would be more likely to be concerned about dynamic pricing practices when i) consumers are unaware of dynamic pricing being used or how it affects prices, ii) when consumers feel pressured to make quick decisions, iii) vulnerable consumers are systematically disadvantaged, or iv) dynamic pricing is used to obtain or maintain market power or to reduce new entry.
Companies should know that EU competition agencies are highly interested in pricing algorithms and the risk of algorithmic collusion. We have experience with algorithmic pricing and can assist with identifying opportunities for obtaining relief as well as protecting against third-party claims.
EU Court Confirms Standards to Justify Exclusivity in Vertical Distribution
On May 8, 2025, the EU’s highest court, the ECJ published its judgment in the Beevers case, following the non-binding recommendations of AG Medina from January 9, 2025, and responding to a reference for a preliminary ruling from a Belgian appeals court. The ECJ held that a supplier may only benefit from an exemption under the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation when providing a distributor with exclusivity for a territory or a group of customers if it can be shown that at the same time rival distributors agreed to respect that exclusivity. Mere absence of sales from rival distributors into the exclusive territory would not be enough to show an explicit or implied agreement, while contractual clauses or a system of monitoring and penalties for infringements of the prohibition would be sufficient evidence of an implied or express assent to the exclusivity system.
The EC is prioritizing investigations into conduct involving exclusive territory or customer allocation and/or export restrictions. Companies should review their distribution policies to ensure they are up to date and effective, especially if they involve elements of exclusivity or territorial/customer restrictions.
EC Official Describes U.S. Cartel Probes as Chilling Sustainability Engagement in the EU
On May 14, 2025, according to public reporting, a senior EC official told an antitrust conference that several companies have withdrawn informal requests for guidance from the EC on potential sustainability initiatives over concerns that the proposed collaboration could become the target of a cartel investigation by antitrust enforcers in the U.S. The official emphasized that the EC remained eager to engage on the topic of sustainability collaborations and that the EC had several “requests in the pipeline.”
Companies should know that many competition authorities in Europe view sustainability agreements positively. At the same time, these authorities are concerned about potential anticompetitive elements of sustainability agreements. We can help design effective sustainability agreements and interface with competition authorities to reduce risk and preempt challenges.
UK Government Publishes Final Version of “Strategic Steer” to the CMA
On May 15, 2025, the UK government published the final version of its “Strategic Steer” for the CMA. The final version contains several mentions of the independence of the CMA. Such mentions had been largely missing from the draft published in February 2025, sparking concerns. On May 7, 2025, a UK junior minister for competition had emphasized the independent nature of the CMA at a conference.
On June 20, 2025, the CMA published a consultation on proposed changes to its mergers guidance on jurisdiction and procedure (CMA2) and the mergers notice template. The draft guidance seeks to improve the pace, predictability, process, and proportionality of the UK’s merger control regime, for instance by adopting key performance objectives, such as a 40-working-day pre-notification performance goal, as well as a 25-working-day target for “straightforward” clearance decisions. CMA officials indicated that the consultation underlines the CMA’s intention (based on the UK government’s steer) to take a backseat for global transactions where merger reviews in other jurisdictions would be likely to address any competition concerns in the UK. However, absent clear guidance, this approach still carries significant uncertainty for dealmakers as to whether the CMA will engage late in the transaction, if reviews in other jurisdictions do not resolve concerns to its satisfaction.Companies should know that the CMA has promised to improve the pace of merger reviews including the prenotification phase and to show greater openness to behavioral remedies in merger investigations. It remains to be seen whether the UK government will substantially limit the ability of the CMA to review global mergers through statutory changes to the existing Share of Supply and material influence tests.
