On Thursday, June 5, 2025, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the notion that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) imposes special requirements on a “majority-group” plaintiff trying to make an initial showing of unlawful discrimination. The ruling resolved a split among federal Courts of Appeals concerning whether majority-group plaintiffs have to meet a higher evidentiary standard than their minority-group counterparts, and is likely to impact workplace discrimination claims going forward.
Background of the case
The defendant, the Ohio Department of Youth Services (the “Department”), hired the plaintiff, Marlean Ames (“Ames”), in 2004 as an executive secretary. Over the years, Ames was promoted from executive secretary to program administrator. In 2019, Ames—a heterosexual woman—applied for a new management position within the Department. Ames interviewed for the new position, but the Department hired another candidate—a lesbian woman. Shortly after interviewing for the new position, Ames was demoted to another role with a significant pay cut. The Department then hired a gay man to fill the program administrator role that Ames had recently occupied.
Decisions from lower courts
Ames filed a lawsuit against the Department alleging she was denied the management position and demoted because of her sexual orientation, in violation of Title VII. Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, and religion. Under prior Supreme Court authority, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is evaluated as a form of sex discrimination under Title VII.
The District Court ruled in favor of the Department prior to proceeding to trial. In its decision, the District Court set out the elements Ames was required to meet in order to make an initial showing of unlawful discrimination under Title VII. These elements—which minority-group plaintiffs would also have to meet—include:
(1) She was a member of a protected class;
(2) She suffered an adverse employment action;
(3) She was qualified for the position; and
(4) She was replaced by someone outside the protected class or was treated differently than similarly-situated, non-protected employees.
However, because Ames was in a “majority-group” (i.e., heterosexual), the District Court imposed an additional obligation on her to show that there were “background circumstances support[ing] the suspicion that the [Department] is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority . . . .” Ames v. Dep't of Youth Servs., No. 2:20-CV-05935, slip op. at 15 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2023) (quotations omitted). The District Court found that Ames failed to meet this additional burden.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s decision, and in doing so, doubled-down on Ames’s obligation to show “background circumstances” that a minority-group employee would not have to show.
The Supreme Court’s decision
In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, the Supreme Court overturned the lower courts’ decisions, stating that Title VII does not impose any additional or special requirements solely upon majority-group plaintiffs. To the contrary, the “background circumstances” rule ran afoul of the longstanding precedent that Title VII protects plaintiffs equally, and the requirements for proving discrimination under Title VII do not vary depending on a plaintiff’s status in a majority or minority group. The Supreme Court further denounced the “background circumstances” rule for imposing heightened, inflexible obligations on all majority-group plaintiffs despite well-established precedent to the contrary.
In sum, the Supreme Court found that the lower courts’ use of the “background circumstances” rule was inappropriate and inconsistent with Title VII. Accordingly, the Supreme Court returned Ames’s case to the District Court and directed it to apply the appropriate standard to her claims.
Justice Thomas’s concurrence
In concurring with the Supreme Court’s decision, Justice Clarence Thomas went a step further by calling into question the very framework courts use to analyze claims brought under Title VII and many other state and federal anti-discrimination laws. This framework—set forth in the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973)—is longstanding precedent, and it is unclear how courts would analyze anti-discrimination claims in its absence. While Justice Thomas’s concurrence is not a ruling opinion of the Supreme Court, it does suggest that at least some portion of the Supreme Court is willing to re-examine the entire legal framework under which discrimination claims are analyzed.
What does this mean for employers?
The current presidential administration’s scrutiny of diversity, equity, and inclusion programs has already heightened the focus on discrimination of majority-group employees, sometimes called “reverse discrimination” claims. Indeed, in a press release earlier this year, the Acting Chair for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission rejected the notions “that civil rights exist solely to remedy harms against certain groups” and “that only the ‘right sort of’ charging party is welcome through our doors . . . .” The Acting Chair issued a similar statement applauding the Ames decision.
For employers, the combination of the Ames decision and the EEOC’s enforcement position makes it likely that majority-group claims will increase going forward. Employers should keep this in mind when making personnel decisions, and, as always, should consider consulting legal counsel for further guidance.
The case is titled: Ames v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Services
