[co-author: Michael Koenig]1
Since the election in November 2024, there have been many changes to DOJ’s enforcement policies. Earlier this year, now-Acting Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division, Matthew R. Galeotti, announced at the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), that going forward prosecutors and investigators would primarily focus on “the most egregious white-collar crime” to better “incentivize [companies] to come forward, come clean, reform, and cooperate with the government.”2
That same day, the Criminal Division released two companion memoranda authored by Galeotti, each signaling significant shifts in white-collar enforcement. The first, titled “Focus, Fairness, and Efficiency in the Fight Against White-Collar Crime”3 (the Galeotti Enforcement Memorandum), outlines procedural reforms and case resolution standards intended to streamline investigations and strengthen individual accountability. The second, “Selection of Monitors in Criminal Division Matters”4 (the Galeotti Monitor Memorandum), updates internal guidance for determining when and how DOJ prosecutors should impose corporate compliance monitors, emphasizing proportionality and efficiency.
Together, these memoranda signal a significant effort to harmonize white-collar enforcement practices with the Administration’s priorities while ostensibly reinforcing DOJ’s commitment to its core principles. The new guidance redefines how individual accountability will be pursued, restructures the use of corporate resolution tools, and recalibrates the role that cooperation will play in making charging decisions and determining remedies. As the Galeotti Enforcement Memorandum5 explains, the revised policies are rooted in three guiding principles:
- Focus: prioritizing high-impact offenses,
- Fairness: holding individuals accountable while rewarding compliant companies, and
- Efficiency: shortening investigations, limiting the use of independent monitors, and reducing costs and collateral impact.
Revised Criminal Division Priorities and Guidelines
The Galeotti Enforcement Memorandum provides that DOJ will target individuals and enterprises that exploit taxpayer-funded programs, such as Medicare, Medicaid, and other health care programs, as well as defense procurement fraud.
Other priority areas include investment fraud, money laundering, and evasion of sanctions and tariffs, all of which are viewed by the Administration as threats to U.S. economic security, competitiveness, or national security.
DOJ will also prioritize digital asset crimes that harm investors or consumers, enable broader criminal schemes, or involve deliberate misuse to fuel significant illegal activity, to “ensure that American businesses are competing on a level playing field in global trade and commerce.”6
In pursuit of that goal, DOJ appears to be creating a Market, Government, and Consumer Fraud Unit within the Fraud Section by combining the Market Integrity and Major Fraud Unit with part of the Civil Division’s Consumer Protection Branch. The new unit will focus on, among other things, tariff evasion, making good on the Galeotti memoranda’s commitment to targeting such crimes.
Additionally, the scope of the DOJ’s whistleblower program, which previously covered specific categories of offenses including foreign and domestic corruption, healthcare fraud, and certain financial crimes,7 has been expanded to include several new categories of criminal offenses, notably: corporate sanctions offenses; trade, tariff, and customs fraud by corporations; and corporate procurement fraud.
The Galeotti Enforcement Memorandum further updates DOJ’s corporate enforcement policy to ensure that companies that voluntarily self-disclose, fully cooperate, and promptly remediate wrongdoing are less likely to face criminal charges. Even in cases involving allegations of serious wrongdoing, prosecutors may still decline prosecution if a company demonstrates full cooperation and effective remediation. In cases lacking voluntary self-disclosure, or where aggravating factors are present, companies that do not qualify for a full declination may still benefit under the DOJ’s revised enforcement approach. The Criminal Division emphasizes holding individual wrongdoers accountable while encouraging corporate compliance, recognizing that not all corporate misconduct warrants prosecution. The Galeotti Enforcement Memorandum affirms that prosecutors must weigh factors such as disclosure, cooperation, and remediation in determining an appropriate resolution, whether through a non-prosecution agreement, deferred prosecution agreement, or guilty plea.
Revised Approach to Monitor Appointments
The Galeotti Monitor Memorandum updates both the criteria for requiring appointment of an independent monitor and the process by which monitors are selected and overseen.8 Prosecutors must clearly explain why a monitor is necessary, tailor the scope of monitorship to address the specific risk of recurrence of the crime and never impose a monitor as a punitive gesture. Under the new guidance, in determining the structure and duration of monitorship, DOJ will emphasize proportionality by ensuring costs of the monitorship align with the severity of and profits derived from the misconduct, taking into account the company’s size and risk profile.
If a company is already under robust regulatory oversight that meets DOJ’s compliance goals, a separate monitorship may be unnecessary. The more proactive a company is in addressing misconduct, such as firing wrongdoers, updating internal controls, and improving compliance systems, the more likely it is to avoid or shorten a monitorship.
In line with the DOJ’s new monitorship policy, the Criminal Division recently reviewed ongoing monitorships and took decisive action, demonstrating real-world application of its revised standards. Notably, the department formally announced the early termination of Glencore’s monitorship, previously imposed after its guilty plea for bribery and market manipulation, citing its “sole discretion under the plea agreement” and a careful “assessment of the facts and circumstances.”9 Albemarle Corporation also announced the early termination of a monitorship earlier this year.10 These moves align precisely with DOJ’s new guidance that monitor appointments must be justified, tailored, and cost proportionate.
The only pending independent compliance consultant requirement is included in a Non-Prosecution Agreement recently concluded between DOJ and the Boeing Company (which was originally a deferred prosecution agreement that included a requirement to appoint an independent compliance monitor). The matter is still under consideration by a federal district court, so the outcome remains uncertain.
Implications for Companies and the C-Suite
To summarize, companies may now secure more favorable resolutions, reduced penalties and shorter oversight periods by self-reporting, cooperating in good faith in DOJ’s investigations, strengthening compliance and embracing transparency.
In response to the revised guidance, companies should reassess key elements of their risk assessment, compliance policies, and controls. As examples, it may be prudent to:
- Undertake proactive investigations to identify misconduct and foster a proactive government-reporting culture to capture the benefits of cooperation credit;
- Ensure that whistleblower policies encourage reporting, protect against retaliation, and are backed by robust internal investigative procedures;
- Reexamine enterprise risk assessment frameworks, to reflect DOJ’s revised priorities;
- Ensure that compliance policies, procedures and internal controls – and periodic internal testing protocols – are modified, if necessary to be fully adapted to the revised criminal enforcement regime; and
- Evaluate the sufficiency of counterparty due diligence tools and practices, to better protect against potential fallout arising from commercial dealings with high-risk entities.
- The authors express appreciation to Giya Sahni, an intern in Secretariat’s Global Investigations & Disputes practice, for her assistance in the preparation of this article.
- https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/head-criminal-division-matthew-r-galeotti-delivers-remarks-sifmas-anti-money-laundering
- https://www.justice.gov/criminal/media/1400046/dl?inline
- https://www.justice.gov/criminal/media/1400036/dl?inline
- https://www.justice.gov/criminal/media/1400046/dl?inline
- Id., 3
- https://www.justice.gov/criminal/criminal-division-corporate-enforcement
- https://www.justice.gov/criminal/media/1400036/dl?inline
- United States v. Glencore Int’l A.G., No. 22 Cr. 297 (LGS) (S.D.N.Y.)
- https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/0000915913/000091591325000084/alb-20250331.htm
