For participants in New York’s construction industry, the distinction between possession of supervisory authority, on the one hand, and the exercise of that authority, on the other, may have significant implications for their liability exposure under the State’s Labor Law statutes. In Ruisech v. Structure Tone Inc., et al., —, —, 2024 NY Slip Op 05866 (2024), the Court of Appeals — the State’s highest court — recently confirmed that, for claims involving injuries arising from a construction laborer’s “means and methods” of work, a defendant’s liability under Labor Law § 200 turns on the defendant’s exercise of supervisory control. In doing so, the Ruisech court quells a troubling but persistent suggestion from the lower courts that authority alone is sufficient to impose Labor Law § 200 liability.
Means and Methods Cases Under Labor Law § 200
Labor Law § 200 protects “the health and safety” of employees on a worksite by assuring them of “reasonable and adequate protection” against dangerous work conditions. See Labor Law § 200(1). The statute does not define the class of defendants to which it applies, but the Court of Appeals has held that “an implicit precondition to this duty is that the party charged with that responsibility have the authority to control the activity bringing about the injury.” Comes v. N.Y. State. Elec. & Gas Corp., 82 N.Y.2d 876, 877 (1993). Thus, parties with overall control and authority over a construction site — such as owners of a building or property under construction, as well as general contractors overseeing the construction — are typically subject to Labor Law § 200 obligations.
While the existence of authority determines who is subject to Labor Law § 200 liability, how that authority is exercised (or withheld) determines whether liability should be imposed. To this end, claims brought under the statute fall into two categories: those arising from a dangerous premises condition and those arising from a danger in the means and methods of the work itself.
Under the premises theory, it must be established that the owner or general contractor either created or had knowledge of a defective premises condition and — in abrogation of their authority — failed to take remedial action. By contrast, liability under a “means and methods” claim is established if an owner or general contractor — in affirmation of their authority — exercised actual supervisory control over the injury-producing work:
"[R]ecovery for breach of the common-law duty of care, as embodied in Labor Law § 200(1), could be had only if the injured employee could demonstrate that the named defendant had a direct hand, through either control or supervision, in the injury-producing work
. . . .
As to plaintiff’s Labor Law § 200(1) claim, the Appellate Division held that [general contractor’s] contractual promise to manage and supervise the construction was sufficient to establish [t]hat defendant may have exercised the requisite control or supervision of the work. . . .[w]hile these promises are not in themselves sufficient to justify holding the general contractor liable…they do furnish cause to believe that further discovery may lead to evidence that [the general contractor’s] employees did exercise actual supervision or control over plaintiff’s worksite."
Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494, 499-506 (1993); see also Comes, 82 N.Y.2d at 877 (“[if] there is no evidence that defendant exercised supervisory control....over the operation, no liability attaches[.]”).
Accordingly, a defendant is subject to Labor Law § 200 liability in means and methods cases if (1) it has authority to supervise and control the injury-producing work and (2) the defendant actually exercised that authority.
Divergent Analysis in Lower Courts
There is a growing number of decisions from the lower New York state courts that have expressed the liability standard in means and methods cases exclusively in terms of whether a defendant possessed the requisite authority. See e.g. Jackson v. Hunter Roberts Constr., L.L.C., 205 A.D.3d 542, 543 (1st Dep’t 2022) (“Defendants established their [e]ntitlement to judgment [b]y demonstrating that they did not have authority to supervise or control the means and methods of plaintiff’s work”); Mejia v. 69 Mamaroneck Rd. Corp., 2024 N.Y. Slip Op 05974, *2-3 (2d Dep’t Nov. 27, 2024) (“To be held liable under Labor Law § 200 for injuries arising from the manner in which work is performed, a defendant must have authority to supervise or control the methods or materials of the injured plaintiff’s work”); Triest v. Nixon Equip. Servs., Inc., 224 A.D.3d 1364, 1366 (4th Dep’t 2024) (“Where, as here, a plaintiff’s injuries stem from the manner in which the work was being performed, no liability attaches to a defendant [u]nless it is shown that the defendant had the authority to supervise or control the performance of the work”).
This tendency to focus solely on the authority prong of the means and methods analysis has led to the emergence of a problematic standard where authority alone is deemed sufficient to impart liability, irrespective of whether that authority has been exercised.
Take, for example, the decision of the Second Department in Brownrigg v. New York City Housing Authority, 119 A.D.3d 504, 507 (2d Dep’t 2014), where the court, in affirming a verdict finding that an owner violated Labor Law § 200, explicitly equated the mere possession of authority with a violation of the statute:
"[O]n that branch of its motion [,] which was to set aside the verdict and for judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 200, the defendant was required to demonstrate that there was no valid line of reasoning by which the jury could have concluded that it had the authority to supervise or control the work…Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the verdict finding that the defendant violated Labor Law § 200, reflecting the jury’s determination that the defendant had the authority to supervise or control the work, was supported by a valid line of reasoning."
However, the Court of Appeals has declared that possession of authority is only a “precondition” to the application of Labor Law § 200. See Comes, 82 N.Y.2d at 877. In other words, possession is necessary, but not sufficient. For the duty to be violated, there must be actual supervision and control; the authority to supervise and control must have been, in fact, exercised. See Comes, 82 N.Y.2d at 877; Ross, 81 N.Y.2d at 506.
Brownrigg and similar decisions speak to a conflation of the standards for determining the existence of a Labor Law § 200 duty (which is established by the existence of a party’s authority) with the breach of that duty (which is established by the exercise of a party’s authority). This sort of conflation has given rise to articulations of a standard that treats possession of supervisory authority as itself sufficient for Labor Law § 200 liability.
The Ruisech Decision
Against what seems like mounting ambiguity surrounding the requirement of authority in means and methods cases, the Court of Appeals’ latest commentary on the issue in Ruisech serves as a much-needed reminder that it is the exercise of authority that is dispositive to the analysis.
Ruisech arises out of a construction site accident involving the installation of a 500-pound glass divider during an interior renovation. The plaintiff and three co-workers were attempting to maneuver the glass panel into an aluminum track on the concrete floor when their employer pulled one worker from the team to work elsewhere. The task at hand became unwieldly for the remaining men and the divider began to topple over. To prevent the divider from falling, plaintiff re-positioned himself to counter the divider’s weight when he lost his footing on cement pebbles and fell.
Among other causes of action, plaintiff alleged a violation of Labor Law § 200 against: (1) the building owner; (2) the building’s managing agent; (3) the tenant-in-possession who contracted for the renovation; and (4) the general contractor, who subcontracted the glass work to plaintiff’s employer. All defendants moved for summary judgment seeking dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint. The trial court did not perceive Ruisech as a case involving the means and methods of work and therefore did not analyze that theory of the case. Instead, the court upheld the Labor Law § 200 claim on a premises theory.
The First Department reversed, finding that the defendants had established they lacked the authority to supervise or control plaintiff’s work. As to the owner, the court remarked “it was an out-of-possession landlord and although it had a right of re-entry to maintain and repair, it was not involved in the project.” See Ruisech v. Structure Tone Inc., 208 A.D.3d 412, 415 (1st Dep’t 2022). As to the tenant and the general contractor, the court noted that they “established that they had no control over the means and methods plaintiff used in performing the work.” Id. And as to the managing agent, the court determined it was not an agent of the owner for the purposes of the Labor Law, suggesting it had no authority over the work. See id.; see also Walls v. Turner Constr. Co., 4 N.Y.3d 861, 864 (2005) (“unless a defendant has supervisory control and authority over the work being done when the plaintiff is injured, there is no statutory agency conferring liability under the Labor Law”).
The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s Labor Law § 200 claim as against the owner, managing agent, and tenant but on a slightly different rationale. Without discussing defendants’ possession of authority, the Court predicated its ruling on the fact that each of these parties “exercised no supervisory control over the operation and thus were not liable for any defect or dangerous condition arising from the contractor’s methods.”
Thus, whereas the intermediate appellate court continued the emerging trend of analyzing means and methods cases on an authority-only basis, the Court of Appeals approached the issue under the prevailing standard, requiring the exercise of authority. Under Ruisech, the exercise of authority — not possession — is determinative in establishing liability in a means and methods case.
That being said, Ruisech is unlikely to be the final word on the issue. The Court of Appeals addressed the possession/exercise distinction in a somewhat passing fashion and did not analyze the issue with respect to the general contractor due to a procedural deficiency in plaintiff’s appeal. Given the many lower court decisions that continue to analyze means and methods cases in terms of possession of authority, it is very likely that the Court of Appeals will take a case that addresses this issue in a more head-on way.
Conclusion
Construction businesses often limit their risk by contractually delegating their supervisory responsibilities to others within the construction chain. Assuming contractual compliance, the expectation is that liability for workplace accidents will properly reside with the parties that actually supervised or controlled the work. This risk management model is pervasive in New York construction practice but has become unsettled by recent Labor Law § 200 decisions suggesting that entities who retain supervisory authority over the work may be subject to liability — even though those responsibilities were delegated to, and discharged by, other parties. For concerned participants and stakeholders in New York’s construction industry, Ruisech should bring a measure of relief. The state’s highest court confirmed that liability extends only to those entities who exercise supervisory control, restoring some level of predictability in risk planning.
