Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
In this asbestos appeal, appellant Sandra Pendergrass — the administratrix of the estate of decedent, Vernetta Merie Coe — appealed the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Civil Division’s grant of summary judgment as to appellees, Ajax Magnethermic Corporation and The Electric Materials Company (TEMCO).
Plaintiffs alleged that decedent contracted mesothelioma following alleged exposure to asbestos from washing the work clothing of her father, Victor Zuccolotte, from 1956 to 1968. During that time, decedent’s father worked at a facility owned and operated by TEMCO, a manufacturer of electrical equipment. In 1962, while decedent’s father worked at TEMCO, a coreless induction melting furnace produced by Ajax was installed at the TEMCO facility in the room adjacent to where decedent’s father worked.
Plaintiffs alleged that decedent was exposed to asbestos from asbestos fibers that were likely contained in the Ajax furnace. In response, Ajex and TEMCO argued that if the Ajex furnace at issue did contain asbestos, the asbestos would have been contained within the appliance itself; thus, any purported asbestos exposure could only have resulted during the installation in 1962 (which decedent’s father was not involved with) and thereafter, only during potential sporadic periods of repair (which decedent’s father was also not involved with).
Ajex and TEMCO ultimately filed motions for summary judgment for lack of product identification. The trial court granted the motions, finding that plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence to allow the jury to draw a casual connection between the Ajax furnace and decedent’s mesothelioma. As a result, the trial court also found that there was no product to form the basis of a strict liability claim against TEMCO.
Plaintiffs subsequently appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in determining that the “fiber drift theory” could not establish a casual link between the room where the Ajex furnace was located and the room where decedent’s father worked, and that the court further erred in determining that the occasional instances of maintenance between 1962 and 1968 were not enough to pass muster under the “frequency, regularity, and proximity” test.
On appeal, the Appellate Court determined the trial court did not err in its grant of appellee’s summary judgment motions. The Appellate Court explained that appellant’s claims relied on a multi-step “casual chain” between decedent’s injury and Ajax’s product, requiring, first, a finding that decedent’s father was exposed to asbestos from fibers emanating from Ajex’s furnace, and, second, that decedent was exposed to those fibers on her father’s work clothing. In other words, appellants were required to establish sufficient frequency, regulatory, and proximity between Ajex’s product and decedent’s father, as well as between decedent’s father and decedent.
Here, according to the court, appellants failed to meet this burden and instead relied upon speculation and an “attenuated casual chain theory.” Per the court, “[Appellant’s] reliance on the fiber drift theory cannot overcome the deficiencies in her proof with respect to [Decedent’s father’s] workplace exposure to asbestos. While fiber drift can assist in showing exposure where the injured party is not in immediate proximity to the asbestos product, it cannot compensate for the failure to adduce competent evidence regarding the frequency and regularity of [Decedent’s father’s] exposure to asbestos fibers.”
For these reasons, both summary judgment motions were affirmed on appeal.
Read the full decision here.
