Doe A.F. v. Lyft, Inc., No. 23-3990-KSM, 2024 WL 4479912 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2024)
The plaintiff alleged that a Lyft driver sexually assaulted her during a rideshare purchased on Lyft’s app.
During discovery, the plaintiff learned that the driver, Shariff Abdallah, was not an authorized Lyft driver, but a friend of an authorized Lyft driver, Ntiamoah Brown. The plaintiff alleged that Mr. Abdallah had previously applied to become a Lyft driver, was rejected, and then used the same number from his rejected application to access Mr. Brown’s account. Mr. Abdallah also changed the account’s location preference from New York City to Philadelphia, added his vehicle to the account, and drove for Lyft for almost six months.
The plaintiff’s original complaint set forth six claims against Lyft, including claims sounding in negligence, gross negligence and vicarious liability. After a proper meet and confer with counsel for Lyft, the plaintiff amended her complaint and included claims of negligence, gross negligence, vicarious liability, negligent performance of undertaking to render services against all defendants, negligent misrepresentation and negligent hiring, training and supervision, and assault and battery against Mr. Brown.
Lyft moved to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). After oral argument on the motion, Lyft withdrew the motion to dismiss as to the negligence and gross negligence counts, while the plaintiff withdrew her claims for vicarious liability, negligent hiring and negligent training. The court dismissed, without prejudice, the plaintiff’s claims for negligent supervision, negligent performance of undertaking to render services and the request for punitive damages. Finally, the court dismissed portions of the plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claim, while permitting her to file a second amended complaint as to the claims dismissed without prejudice.
In the second amended complaint, the plaintiff added a new claim against Lyft, for the first time, sounding in strict product liability, alleging Lyft’s algorithm was defective in that it did not prevent or reduce the incidence of sexual assault and/or rape in any meaningful way and that it failed to provide adequate warnings. Lyft moved to dismiss the second amended complaint arguing, in relevant part, the strict product liability claim should be stricken because the plaintiff did not obtain Lyft’s consent or leave of court to add a new theory of liability, and, because the statute of limitations had expired, the strict product liability claims did not “relate back” to the original complaint.
The court agreed with Lyft and dismissed the strict product liability claim for two reasons. First, the plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 15(a)(2), which required the defendant’s consent or leave of court to add a new theory of liability into the complaint. Second, even had the plaintiff sought leave or court, the statute of limitations barred the strict product liability claim. Accordingly, the plaintiff was permitted to move forward with her claims sounding in negligence, only.
This case highlights that defendants must have an understanding of the rules of court and should be aggressive in moving to strike improper pleadings in accordance with those rules.
