[co-author: Patricia Santiago]
Litigants in Puerto Rico now have an easier path to challenge administrative agencies’ determinations after the Puerto Rico Supreme Court (PRSC) ruled in Vázquez v. Consejo de Titulares, 2025 TSPR 56, that courts shall not grant automatic deference to the conclusions of law of agencies.
In the opinion, issued on May 21, 2025 and delivered by Justice Erick Kolthoff Caraballo, the PRSC ruled that all courts have the duty of revising agencies’ conclusions of law in all aspects. The PRSC stated that the mere fact that a law is ambiguous will not entail that the courts should give deference to the interpretation of the law of an administrative agency, even if the agency has exclusive primary jurisdiction to see claims on the matter in controversy.
Background
In the case, two individuals filed a complaint before the Puerto Rico Department of Consumer Affairs (DACO, by its Spanish acronym), against the Council of Owners and the Board of Directors of their condominium. They challenged the appointment of the manager of the condominium, stating that his election was incompatible with the Puerto Rico Condominium Act, Act 129-2020.
DACO determined that the manager was a contractor, according to said law, and that since he was also the owner of an apartment, the condominium had to request three quotes before appointing him as a service provider to avoid conflicts of interest.
The Puerto Rico Court of Appeals reversed DACO’s decision. The Court of Appeals held that the classification of the manager as a contractor, instead of an agent with a legal mandate, was contrary to the PRSC’s previous opinion in Colón Ortiz v. Asoc. Cond. B.T. I, 185 DPR 946 (2012).
DACO requested review by the PRSC, arguing that the appellate court did not grant deference to it as the agency with expertise in the Condominium Act and did not recognize its role in the formulation of public policy by interpreting the legislative intention behind the Condominium Act.
Vázquez v. Consejo de Titulares decision
The PRSC confirmed and found that DACO abused its discretion by ignoring case law precedent. The PRSC held that, because the manager was not a contractor, the condominium did not need to undergo the process of requesting additional quotations. The PRSC determined that DACO issued incorrect conclusions of law and took the opportunity to discuss the rule about the deference owed by courts to administrative agencies under the Puerto Rico Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, Act 38-2017 (LPAU, by its Spanish acronym).
The PRSC framed its opinion based on the recent US Supreme Court decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244, 219 L.Ed.2d 832 (2024), which overruled the Chevron deference doctrine and stated that the final interpretation of the law is the courts’ domain and courts must exercise independent judgment to determine and interpret the law.
The PRSC’s opinion explains that Section 4.5 of the LPAU intentionally amended the administrative law framework to allow for agencies’ conclusions of law to be entirely subject to judicial revision. Nevertheless, interpreting Section 4.5, the PRSC had stated in the case Super Asphalt v. AFI, 206 DPR 803 (2021) – prior to Loper Bright – that appellate courts should still grant deference to administrative agencies based on their expertise in the topics delegated to them. The 2025 opinion – following the lead of Loper Bright – departed from such expression and stated that agencies’ determinations only provide guidance; the final interpretation of the law relies on courts.
In a concurring expression, Chief Justice Maite Oronoz Rodríguez expressed that it was unnecessary to refer to the federal case Loper Bright, given that the LPAU and PRSC precedent, for example, in Otero Rivera v. Bella Retail Group, Inc., 2024 TSPR 70, already stated that the conclusions of law of administrative agencies are reviewable in all respects by the courts and deference to agencies does not extend automatically to conclusions of law.
Justice Luis Estrella Martínez, joined by Chief Justice Oronoz Rodríguez, issued a concurring opinion reiterating that it was unnecessary to refer to Loper Bright, as Puerto Rico law and jurisprudence already supported the ruling. This opinion highlighted that judicial deference should not provide immunity to administrative actions. Nevertheless, it states that the ruling does not establish a presumption of incorrectness of agencies’ conclusions of law.
On the other hand, Justice Angel Colón Pérez issued a dissenting opinion, affirming that the court was only called to answer a question arising from the facts. Justice Colón Pérez stated that DACO’s interpretation was correct, because Article 58 of the Condominium Act states that owners can only provide professional services if they are selected from among three quotes. He indicated that this is not incompatible with the manager being considered an agent after the manager’s professional services are hired by contract.
Going forward
The opinion in Vázquez v. Consejo de Titulares provides an additional tool for litigants interested in challenging administrative agencies’ conclusions of law because there will be no need to overcome automatic deference in this regard. Nevertheless, since the conclusions of law of the agencies will not necessarily be presumed correct, the regulatory scheme could become less predictable. This could result in more specific legislation on the scope of power of administrative agencies, increased regulation from agencies, and more review of specialized matters by the courts. Entities subject to Puerto Rico administrative agencies are encouraged to evaluate their options in light of the Vázquez v. Consejo de Titulares opinion.
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