Just today, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved a contentious disagreement between courts regarding the burden of proof required to bring a disparate treatment claim under Title VII. While the majority of appeals courts in the United States did not impose an extra burden on employees asserting claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act regardless of their status, some courts required employees with a majority background—such as white, male, or heterosexual individuals—to prove additional circumstances existed in order to succeed on a Title VII claim. That extra burden has now been eliminated, and employees of all backgrounds are on equal footing when asserting disparate treatment under Title VII.
On June 5, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its long-awaited decision in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services. The petitioner, Marlean Ames, claimed she was discriminated against because of her sexual orientation (heterosexual) in violation of Title VII after a lesbian woman was selected for a management position over her, and Ames was demoted in favor of a gay man. The trial and appeals courts both found in favor of the employer, the Ohio Department of Youth Services. In reaching that conclusion, the lower courts applied a higher standard for Ames to prove her discrimination claim. Since Ames is heterosexual (a majority characteristic) and not a minority, the lower courts required Ames to show “background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.” The lower courts reasoned that as a straight woman, Ames was required to make this showing in addition to the usual elements to prove a discrimination claim. The appeals court for Sixth Circuit stated that plaintiffs can typically satisfy this burden, where applicable, by presenting “evidence that a member of the relevant minority group (here, gay people) made the employment decision at issue, or with statistical evidence showing a pattern of discrimination . . . against members of the majority group.” Ames was unable to present either type of evidence.
The Sixth Circuit was not alone in its requirement for majority-background plaintiffs to meet a heightened standard of proof. Four other circuits – the Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and District of Columbia – similarly required majority-group plaintiffs to satisfy a higher burden in proving discrimination under Title VII. The first step of proving a discrimination claim in court typically requires a plaintiff to present evidence “that she applied for an available position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” But, under Sixth Circuit precedent, majority-group plaintiffs must also show their employer is an “unusual” one “who discriminates against the majority.’” According to SCOTUS, this heightened standard cannot be squared with Title VII or Supreme Court precedent.
Today, SCOTUS decided that members from a majority group are not required to satisfy a higher evidentiary standard in order to prevail on a Title VII discrimination claim. In reaching this conclusion, SCOTUS concluded that Title VII’s discrimination provisions make no distinction between majority-group plaintiffs and minority-group plaintiffs – the law focuses on individuals. “By establishing the same protections for every ‘individual’ — without regard to that individual’s membership in a minority or majority group — Congress left no room for courts to impose special requirements on majority-group plaintiffs alone.”
Therefore, the highest court has ruled that the standard for establishing discrimination under Title VII shall not vary based on whether the plaintiff is a member of a minority group or majority group. The Supreme Court’s decision aligns with recent guidance from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which makes it clear that Title VII’s protections apply to all individuals – not just individuals who are part of a minority group (such as racial or ethnic minorities, women, or historically underrepresented groups). The EEOC has made it clear that differential treatment based on race, sex, national origin, or any other protected characteristic is unlawful, no matter what type of applicant or employee is harmed: “The EEOC’s position is that there is no such thing as ‘reverse’ discrimination; there is only discrimination. The EEOC applies the same standard of proof to all race discrimination claims, regardless of the victim’s race.”
The Commission’s position is now the law, and it means employees from majority backgrounds now have a significantly easier path to the courtroom. Employers should be aware that all employees are equally empowered to seek redress under Title VII and work to ensure that employment decisions are based on facts and merit rather than status of an individual. Employers should also be mindful that while the Ames opinion was focused on disparate treatment claims – those related to adverse employment actions — it opens the door for a similarly lowered burden for hostile work environment claims as well.
Additionally, while the court did not expressly address affirmative action plans in Ames, its ruling is another step toward calling into question affirmative action’s future viability. The Supreme Court has previously rejected the use of such plans in the academic admission setting, and the current administration has issued several executive orders calling for the removal of the same in employment contexts.
Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, 605 U.S. ___ (2025)
