In a 7-2 decision, the United States Supreme Court has limited the factors a district court can consider when sentencing a defendant for a revocation of supervised release. The Supreme Court held that district courts cannot consider “retributive considerations,” such as the seriousness of the offense and providing just punishment, when determining the appropriate sentence for defendants facing revocation of a term of supervised release and must instead limit their focus to forward-looking considerations that further “rehabilitative ends.”
Justice Amy Coney Barrett, writing for the majority, stated, “[S]upervised release isn’t a punishment in lieu of incarceration, but instead ‘fulfills rehabilitative ends’ and ‘provides individuals with postconfinement assistance.’… So when a defendant violates a condition of supervised release, it makes sense that a court must consider the forward-looking ends of sentence (deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation), but may not consider the backward-looking purpose of retribution.”
In Esteras v. United States, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s sentence, holding that a district court, when revoking supervised release, may consider all of the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors, which include the retributive considerations of “seriousness of the underlying offense, respect for the law, and just punishment.” While on supervised release, Esteras was arrested and charged with domestic violence, aggravated menacing, and criminal damaging. All charges were later dismissed at the victim’s request. As a result, the district court ordered Esteras to 24 months of imprisonment (an upward variance from the advisory 6 to 12 month range), and revoked his supervised release term, stating that his earlier sentence was “rather lenient” and that his sentence for the revocation needed to “promote respect for the law,” as enumerated at § 3553(a)(2)(A).
Until this ruling, the circuits were split on whether the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors may be considered when revoking a term of supervised release. The First, Second, Third, and Sixth circuits held that district courts may consider the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors, where the Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth circuits held they cannot consider those factors.
The Supreme Court noted that Congress’ decision to omit the sentencing factors at § 3553(a)(2)(A) when deciding whether to revoke a supervised release term, specifically excluding retribution, was intentional and consistent with the purpose that supervised release serves in the sentencing process. In two prior cases, the Court noted that supervised release “is not a punishment in lieu of incarceration.” United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 50 (1994), and that supervised release “fulfills rehabilitative ends and provides individuals with postconfinement assistance.” United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59-60 (2000).
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, in a concurring opinion, reiterated Congress’ intent when omitting the sentencing factors at § 3553(a)(2)(A), noting that retribution should not play a role in revocation hearings. In her opinion, Justice Sotomayor quoted from Senate Report No. 98-225, p. 124 (1983), noting that “the primary goal” of supervised release “is to ease the defendant’s transition into the community…or to provide rehabilitation.”
Key Takeaways:
- The Supreme Court’s decision clarifies that supervised release is meant to support rehabilitation and successful reentry, not to serve as further punishment for the original crime.
- The ruling vacated lower court decisions that had allowed consideration of these broader punitive factors and remanded the cases for further proceedings in line with the new guidance.
- In concurring opinions, the Justices stressed that retribution should play no role in supervised release revocation decisions.
- The decision narrows judicial discretion and reinforces Congress’ intent to limit the grounds for reimprisonment after supervised release.
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