In Ames v. Ohio Dep't of Youth Servs., No. 23-1039, 2025 WL 1583264, (U.S. June 5, 2025), the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that majority group plaintiffs (in this instance, a heterosexual plaintiff) do not need to meet a heightened evidentiary standard demonstrating “background circumstances” to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).
What was the case about?
In Ames v. Ohio Dep't of Youth Servs., Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, had worked for the Ohio Department of Youth Services (ODYS) in various positions for 15 years, applied and was interviewed for a management position with the ODYS in 2019. The ODYS ultimately hired a different candidate (a lesbian woman), demoted Ms. Ames from her program administrator role to a secretarial role, which included a significant pay cut, and hired a gay man to fill the vacant program administrator role. Ms. Ames sued the ODYS under Title VII, alleging the organization discriminated against her based on sexual orientation when it denied her a management promotion and demoted her. The federal District Court granted ODYS’s motion for summary judgment, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, applying the three-step McDonnell Douglas framework used in assessing disparate-treatment claims when there is no direct evidence of discrimination. The first step of this framework requires a plaintiff to allege facts that give rise to an inference of discrimination. If a plaintiff fails to meet this first step of the analysis (i.e., establish a prima facie case), a court will not proceed further to the second step, which requires an employer to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its adverse action.
In assuming that most employers do not discriminate against majority-groups, the Sixth Circuit held that Ms. Ames failed to establish a prima facie case for discrimination as she did not make the “requisite showing” of “‘background circumstances’ to support the suspicion that the [ODYS] is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority,” and did not proceed further with its analysis of the case. See Ames v. Ohio Dep't of Youth Servs., 87 F.4th 822, 825 (6th Cir. 2023). As to the specific “background circumstances” that Ms. Ames should have presented, the Sixth Circuit wrote that “[p]laintiffs typically make that showing with evidence that a member of the relevant minority group (here, gay people) made the employment decision at issue, or with statistical evidence showing a pattern of discrimination by the employer against members of the majority group.” Id. at 825.
What did the Supreme Court say?
The Supreme Court found the Sixth Circuit’s “background circumstances” rule was inconsistent with Title VII. Writing for the majority, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson reasoned that “[t]he Sixth Circuit's ‘background circumstances’ rule [incorrectly] requires plaintiffs who are members of a majority group to bear an additional burden… But the text of Title VII's disparate-treatment provision draws no distinctions between majority-group plaintiffs and minority-group plaintiffs. The provision focuses on individuals rather than groups, barring discrimination against ‘any individual’ because of protected characteristics. Congress left no room for courts to impose special requirements on majority-group plaintiffs alone.” See Ames, at *1. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case for determination based on the proper prima facie standard.
Lessons for Employers
- Title VII is inclusive in its application. Meaning any individual – not just those in minority groups – is protected from discrimination because of the individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
- Even if an employee is successful in raising an inference of discrimination (i.e., step 1), the case is not over. Rather, the employer will then have an opportunity to prove there was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action (i.e., step 2), and thereafter the employee must still prove that discrimination was a motivating factor for the adverse action (i.e., step 3).
- Concurring Justices in Ames signaled that workplace DEI initiatives may be susceptible to scrutiny as “overtly discriminat[ory]” under Title VII. While not the focus of the decision, in the concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas (joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch) wrote, “a number of this Nation's largest and most prestigious employers have overtly discriminated against those they deem members of so-called majority groups. American employers have long been ‘obsessed’ with ‘diversity, equity, and inclusion’ initiatives and affirmative action plans.” See Ames, at *8.
- Concurring Justices signal an appetite to reconsider whether and how the McDonnell Douglas framework should be used in Title VII discrimination cases. In the concurring opinion, J. Thomas and J. Gorsuch criticized “judge-made rule[s]” such as the “background circumstances” rule created by the Sixth Circuit and the McDonnell Douglas framework established by the Supreme Court itself. The Justices opined that the McDonnell Douglas framework had no basis in the text of Title VII and described it as “tak[ing] on a life of its own” over the years insofar as courts have extended its application beyond bench trials (as it was originally intended) and to summary judgment motions. See Ames, at *9. The Justices signaled that if an appropriate case were presented before the Supreme Court, at least some of the Justices would be interested in determining whether the well-established three-step burden shifting tool should be used when considering a motion for summary judgment.
1 More than fifty years ago, the Supreme Court established the three-step burden shifting framework for evaluating disparate-treatment claims when there is no conclusive evidence of discriminatory intent (the “McDonnell Douglas framework”). See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
