[co-author: Peyton Soethout]
With its recent ruling in McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 606 U.S. ___ (2025), the U.S. Supreme Court has continued its trend of reining in the power of agencies and giving litigants more avenues to push back against administrative rulemaking. This will have significant consequences in the context of statutes like the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), which has steadily increased in scope over the years thanks to the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”). More generally, the Court’s decision in McLaughlin Chiropractic, paired with last year’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024) (which we discussed here), raises significant questions about whether those FCC regulations carry any meaningful weight at this point.
Historically, limiting the scope of agency power tends to be good news for defendants. It thus is a bit ironic that the decision in McLaughlin Chiropractic, which will ultimately help defendants fight against aggressive regulations, actually benefited the plaintiff. On June 20, 2025, the Court in McLaughlin Chiropractic held, in a 6-3 decision, that the “Hobbs Act does not preclude district courts” from assessing an agency’s interpretation of a relevant statute. Id. at *4. The Hobbs Act provides for pre-enforcement judicial review of FCC orders. The defendant, McKesson Corporation (“McKesson”), allegedly sent unsolicited fax advertisements to medical practices through traditional and online fax machines. McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates (“McLaughlin”) sued McKesson for the unsolicited faxes, and the district court certified a class with no distinction between those who received traditional and online faxes. During the litigation, another company petitioned the FCC for a declaratory ruling on whether the TCPA applies to online fax services. The FCC issued an order, ruling that an online fax service is not a “telephone facsimile machine” under the TCPA. As a result, both the district court and the Ninth Circuit in deferred to the FCC’s interpretation of the TCPA and decertified the class with the businesses that received unsolicited advertisements digitally.
The Supreme Court considered how judicial review functions under the Hobbs Act and identified three categories of statutes that authorize pre-enforcement review of agency rules: (1) statutes that expressly preclude judicial review, (2) statutes that expressly authorize judicial review, and (3) statutes that are silent on the issue of judicial review. Id. at *6-7. The Hobbs Act falls into the third category because it is silent on judicial review in enforcement proceedings. Despite the statute’s silence on judicial review, courts often have relied on the Hobbs Act to defer to FCC rulings, as seen here with the Ninth Circuit. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of judicial review in situations where statutes do not expressly preclude it. Id. at *8. Specifically, the Court noted the long-recognized presumption of judicial review. Id.
As with any decision that increases opportunity for judicial review, McLaughlin Chiropractic may lead to potential circuit splits. However, the decision restores judicial review in a space where it was not recognized or utilized in recent years. Now, parties can challenge agency rulings that they believe are not in line with the law, and district courts can independently interpret the TCPA (and other statutes) to determine if the FCC’s interpretation is correct. Judicial review under the TCPA will be incredibly impactful because the FCC has long been responsible for interpreting how the TCPA may apply to modern technology (if at all). Previously, the FCC’s pronouncements on such issues were often treated as settled, leaving little recourse for contesting parties. Now, interpretations by the FCC are open to judicial review that the Hobbs Act never expressly precluded.
As court rulings continue to diminish the power of agencies, we’ll keep a close watch on how the landscape is changing.
[View source.]
