Social media safety is very much in the news these days, with policymakers unleashing a torrent of legislation to protect children online, such as age verification measures, parental consent mandates, data privacy requirements, and limits on data collection and targeted advertising. The social media safety battle is also playing out in the courts, with plaintiffs seeking to hold platform operators liable for harms that occur on their platforms due to the activities of their users. As the Ninth Circuit recently confirmed, however, in at least some cases, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act remains a formidable shield against such claims.
On February 18, 2025, the Ninth Circuit, reviewing de novo, affirmed the district court’s dismissal in John Doe v. Grindr (which we covered last year). The Ninth Circuit panel held that the district court properly dismissed Doe’s state law claims—defective design, defective manufacturing, negligence, failure to warn, and negligent misrepresentation—as well as a federal claim under the civil remedy provision of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), all on the grounds of Section 230 immunity.
Grindr is a popular LGBTQ+ dating app that connects users based on their geolocation. The platform has been at the center of prior Section 230 cases, playing a key role in shaping how courts interpret the statute, which continues to provide immunity for online platforms despite increasing legal and legislative challenges.
Citing Barnes v. Yahoo!, the Ninth Circuit applied the standard three-part test to determine whether Section 230 immunized Grindr from Doe’s state law claims. Under the Barnes test, Section 230 provides protection for: (1) a provider or user of an interactive computer service (2) whom the plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state law cause of action, as a publisher or speaker (3) of information provided by another information content provider.
The court held that the first Barnes test prong was undisputed, but prongs two and three required consideration of whether Doe’s theory of liability in each cause of action treated Grindr as a publisher or speaker of third-party content. The court emphasized that Section 230 immunity only applies if the plaintiff’s claims arise from the defendant’s status or conduct as a publisher or speaker.
The court determined that each of Doe’s state law claims “necessarily implicates Grindr’s role as a publisher of third-party content.”
First, the court examined Doe’s claims for defective design, defective manufacturing, and negligence, which alleged that Grindr facilitated communication among users engaged in illegal activity. While Doe argued that Grindr had a duty to suppress communications between adults and minors to prevent exchanges that could lead to illegal activity, the court noted that these claims “necessarily implicate[d] Grindr’s role as a publisher of third-party content.” As carrying out the alleged duty would require Grindr to monitor third-party communications, the court held that Section 230 immunity applied.
Doe’s theory of liability focused on Grindr’s failure to prevent minors from being matched with potential predators, arguing that the app’s use of geographic data to connect users enabled harmful communication. The Ninth Circuit cited Dyroff v. Ultimate Software (which found that an app’s features, functions, and algorithms that analyze user content and recommend connections “are tools meant to facilitate the communication and content of others”) to affirm that Section 230 barred the similar state law claims in this case. The court emphasized that “neutral features” were intended to facilitate communication and were not “content in and of themselves.”
The court further rejected Doe’s attempt to liken his claims to those in Lemmon v. Snap, which we’ve previously covered, where the plaintiff overcame a Section 230 defense by arguing that the claims were based on design defects in the defendant’s platform rather than on publication of user content. The court noted that, in Lemmon, the defendant’s duty to avoid designing a dangerous product was entirely independent of the defendant’s role in monitoring or publishing third-party content, which was not applicable to Doe’s claims in this case.
Next, the court analyzed Doe’s duty to warn theory, namely that Grindr had a duty to warn Doe about the risks of child sexual exploitation. The court distinguished Doe v. Internet Brands, where the plaintiff’s claim faulted the defendant for “failing to warn [plaintiff] about information it obtained from an outside source,” regarding a known conspiracy operating independent from the platform’s publishing function. Here, Doe did not allege that Grindr had independent knowledge of such a conspiracy, and Grindr’s role as a publisher of third-party content does not create a duty to warn users about “a general possibility of harm” from use of the app.
The court then considered Doe’s negligent misrepresentation claim, which was based on Grindr’s alleged failure to maintain a “safe and secure environment for its users,” despite asserting through its terms that it would. The court distinguished this case from Barnes and Estate of Bride v. Yolo Technologies (which we wrote about previously), where plaintiffs sought to hold defendants accountable for specific promises rather than for a failure to take certain moderation actions. Here, Grindr’s general assertion was not a concrete promise but merely a broad description of its moderation policy. Compared to the specific commitments at issue in Barnes and Estate of Bride, the court held that Grindr’s statement was “too general to be enforced.”
The court also rejected Doe’s attempt to bring a federal claim under the civil remedy provision of the TVPRA. It found that Doe failed to state a plausible cause of action because the complaint did not adequately allege that Grindr either (i) was a known perpetrator of sex trafficking or (ii) knowingly benefitted from sex trafficking. As a result, plaintiff Doe could not invoke the statutory exception to Section 230 immunity established by the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA) for certain child sex trafficking claims.
To be considered a known perpetrator of sex trafficking, Grindr must either be “a knowing perpetrator of sex trafficking” or “a person that knowingly benefitted from the sex trafficking.” Mere association with sex traffickers is insufficient, the court held, without knowing participation through assistance or facilitation (citing Does v. Reddit, which we’ve also previously covered).
The court noted that “turning a blind eye to sex trafficking that may occur on [Grindr] does not constitute active participation in sex trafficking.” Grindr merely “provided a platform that facilitated sharing of messages between users,” and only “matches users who have represented to the App that they are over eighteen years old.” As a result, the court rejected Doe’s claims that Grindr “knowingly introduces children to adults for in-person sexual encounters.”
Regarding Doe’s beneficiary theory under the TVPRA, the court held that Doe did not adequately allege that Grindr benefitted from the alleged sex trafficking beyond the general receipt of advertising revenue. The court emphasized that it is not enough to merely “turn a blind eye” to the source of revenue. In other words, the defendant must have both actual knowledge of sex trafficking and a causal relationship between its conduct that furthers sex trafficking and the receipt of a benefit.
Section 230 is facing increasing pressure, including proposals to repeal the law entirely, but Doe v. Grindr shows that the statute continues to provide online platforms with a potent shield against liability arising from their users’ activities, even in cases involving allegations of harm to minors. The court’s decision makes clear that, at least for now and at least in the Ninth Circuit, merely enabling users to communicate doesn’t make the platform responsible for what those users do offline.
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