Overview
On July 11, 2025, the Seventh Circuit issued a ruling in Arana v. Board of Regents, reversing summary judgment for the defendant university. In its ruling in the case, which involved the readmission of a star football player after he was expelled for sexual assault, the Court made several notable holdings which could expand the scope of institutional Title IX liability.
What You Need to Know:
In the Seventh Circuit, pending any further requests for rehearing or review, it is now the law that:
- A single incident of “egregious” student-student sexual harassment, even without prior notice to the institution, may be found to be sufficiently pervasive as to give rise to liability under Title IX;
- A student may be determined to have been deprived of access to education programs and activities even if their academic performance does not suffer, if their educational experience was affected; and
- An institution, having adequately responded to a Title IX complaint, may still be found to be deliberately indifferent if it takes later action which “effectively nullifie[s]” that response (such as, in the Arana case, re-admitting a student who had been expelled), even where no further incidents of harassment occurred.
What Happened? The Arana Case: Background and Holding
In April 2018, University of Wisconsin student Isabelle Arana alleged that, after a night of heavy drinking, football player Quintez Cephus sexually assaulted her while she was intoxicated and unable to give consent. The University conducted an investigation and found Cephus responsible for sexual assault and sexual harassment. Cephus was expelled and appealed to both the University’s Chancellor and the Board of Regents. Both appeals were denied.
A criminal trial occurring after the Title IX investigation resulted in Cephus being acquitted. Cephus then filed a petition for readmission to the University, supported by new evidence purportedly developed during the criminal prosecution that Cephus claimed called into question the University’s findings (which were, of course, subject to a less stringent standard of proof). A few short weeks later, the Chancellor granted the petition, vacating the sexual assault finding, while upholding the sexual harassment finding. This was determined without input from Arana, and allegedly under pressure from influential parties who wanted Cephus back on the field, including five donors who each had given at least $1 million to the University, and, collectively, potentially over $100 million; dozens of football players; and the head football coach.
The next semester, both parties returned to campus, subject to a pre-existing no-contact order. Fearful of encountering Cephus on campus, Arana met with University personnel, but was dissatisfied by their stance that there was no actionable threat to Arana at the time. Arana thereafter skipped class, avoided the student union and study spaces, avoided walking through areas of campus where she might run into Cephus, reduced her attendance at sorority events, and transferred from advanced courses to less challenging ones. Although her performance remained strong, the reduced courseload delayed her graduation – intended to be after three years, rather than the typical four – by a semester, which in turn delayed law school matriculation by a full year.
In June 2020, Arana filed suit against the University, alleging that its readmission of Cephus constituted deliberate indifference to the sexual harassment that she experienced in violation of Title IX. The district court denied Arana’s motion for summary judgment and granted the University’s.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that a reasonable jury could find that: (1) Arana presented sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the single incident of harassment she experienced was “sufficiently egregious as to be pervasive”; (2) Arana sufficiently established deprivation of educational opportunities where she was unable to enjoy the full panoply of educational opportunities that made her classmates’ experiences enriching; and (3) the readmission of Cephus was unreasonable and deliberately indifferent to the sexual harassment Arana suffered. The Court did not consider the argument that the underlying misconduct was not actionable because it occurred at a private apartment (i.e., an environment outside the University’s control), finding it to have been improperly raised.
Why This Ruling Matters
Arana is notable because it could drastically expand Title IX liability for institutions of higher education. While the seminal case of Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629 (1999), found that actionable sexual harassment must be severe and pervasive, casting doubt on the concept that a single incident of harassment could qualify as the latter, the Arana court did not view that expression of doubt as authoritative, opening the door to claims undergirded by a more limited scope of conduct. As noted above, the Court held that conduct may be “pervasive” if it is “sufficiently egregious,” seemingly collapsing severity and pervasiveness into one factor rather than distinct concepts. In support of this approach, the Court quotes Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 165, 172 (1st Cir. 2007), for the proposition that “single incidents of harassment may create Title IX liability ‘if that incident were vile enough and the institution’s response, after learning of it, unreasonable enough to have the combined systemic effect of denying access to a scholastic program or activity.’” The Arana Court, then, also appears to suggest that the institution’s own responsive conduct should be considered alongside the underlying sexual harassment as part of the “severe and pervasive” analysis, collapsing it with the deliberate indifference analysis.[1]
While Davis held that Title IX liability only attaches where a school’s deliberate indifference “subjects its students to harassment,” 526 U.S. at 644, the Arana court staked a flag with sister circuits which have opened the door to claims that involved no actionable post-notice misconduct at all, so long as the plaintiff was, due to the institution’s actions or omissions, made more vulnerable to such misconduct. And, while Davis spoke of the deprivation of access to education, the Arana court found that such a deprivation may lie in cases in which the victim continues to thrive academically, under the theory that they may not have achieved the “full spectrum of success” they may have otherwise.
Arana is now controlling authority in the Seventh Circuit. Schools in other jurisdictions should pay close attention, as courts across the country may treat Arana as persuasive authority when ruling on the issues presented in this case if they are novel in that circuit. With respect to the single incident issue specifically, several circuits have not yet determined this issue, and those that have are divided.
What’s Next?
Because the Court determined that there were disputes of fact regarding core issues such as whether the conduct plaintiff experienced was pervasive, whether she was deprived of the benefits of her educational program in the aftermath of the incident, and whether the university’s response was clearly unreasonable, it remanded the case for further proceedings. We can anticipate further developments in connection with any number of next potential procedural steps, including the outcome of a potential rehearing en banc; the outcome on remand; and any further appeals.
The Higher Education Group at Saul Ewing will keep a close eye on this case, given its potential significance for colleges and universities as they work to mount effective and legally compliant responses to student-student sexual harassment. Please do not hesitate to contact the authors of this alert, or your regular Saul Ewing point(s) of contact, with any questions about the substance of this alert.
[1]Notably, the Fitzgerald Court, in the same passage, noted the following: “In all events, a single incident of harassment must be such as to produce a ‘systemic effect on educational programs or activities’ in order to engender liability under Title IX.” Id. at 173 n.3. It did not call for the consideration of the school’s response in assessing the level of harassment. Also of note, unlike the fact pattern in Arana, the fact pattern in Fitzgerald included numerous “post-notice interactions between the victim and the harasser.” Id. at 173.
