On June 20, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its ruling in McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., holding that the federal Hobbs Act does not bind district courts in civil enforcement proceedings to a federal agency’s interpretation of a statute. The Court held that district courts must independently determine the law’s meaning under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation while affording appropriate respect to the agency’s interpretation.
McKesson turned on the narrow question of whether federal district courts must adhere to a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) finding that the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) does not prohibit “junk faxes” that are received only via online fax services. The impact of the opinion, however, is much broader. Indeed, McKesson is just the latest example of the Roberts Court limiting federal courts’ deference to federal agencies. In the TCPA litigation arena, McKesson will likely create waves, as courts will now be free (indeed, required) to independently analyze and interpret the contours of the 34-year old TCPA, one of the most heavily litigated statutes in the country.
Background
As discussed in a previous alert, McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates filed a putative class action complaint against McKesson in 2013. The complaint alleged that that McKesson violated the TCPA by sending unsolicited “junk faxes” (i.e., faxes containing advertisements and solicitations) without offering an opt-out mechanism to recipients. Some of the alleged faxes were received only through online fax services. In 2019, the district court initially certified a class of plaintiffs who had allegedly received the junk faxes.
Shortly after the class was certified, however, the FCC issued a declaratory ruling, holding that the TCPA only applies to physical fax machines and not to online fax services. In that ruling, the FCC determined that Congress did not intend the TCPA’s fax prohibition to apply to faxes sent to equipment other than a “telephone facsimile machine.” The FCC ruled that faxes sent by online fax services that consumers may delete without printing are in effect the same as “email sent over the Internet.” The FCC’s ruling was consistent with its authority under the Hobbs Act, and consistent with its practice of interpreting and regulating the TCPA.
Following the FCC’s 2019 ruling, the district court decertified the class in McKesson, finding that it was impossible to distinguish between the “junk faxes” sent to a physical fax machine and those received only through online fax services. As a result, the court was unable to determine which putative class members had claims (i.e., those who received a fax through a fax machine) and which putative class members did not have claims (i.e., those who received a fax through an online service).
In 2023, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court’s decertification holding that lower courts are bound under the Hobbs Act to defer to the FCC’s orders.
The Hobbs Act
The Hobbs Act provides that for certain pre-enforcement challenges to agency orders, “[t]he court of appeals . . . has exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of all final orders of the Federal Communications Commission” and other agencies. 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1). Under the Hobbs Act, when the FCC issues certain orders, any “party aggrieved” has 60 days to file a petition in a court of appeals seeking review of the order and declaratory or injunctive relief against the enforcement of the order.1
Circuit courts were divided as to whether this pre-enforcement review provision required district courts to defer to the FCC’s interpretation in any subsequent enforcement proceedings after the review period closed.
The Supreme Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision that lower courts are bound under the Hobbs Act to defer to the FCC’s orders, including the one challenged in McKesson.
The Court held that the “Hobbs Act does not preclude district courts in enforcement proceedings from independently assessing whether an agency’s interpretation of the relevant statute is correct . . . therefore the District Court should interpret the TCPA under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, affording appropriate respect to the agency’s interpretation.”
The Court explained there are three categories of statutes which authorize pre-enforcement judicial review of a federal agency’s statutory interpretation: (1) statutes such as the Clean Air Act which expressly preclude judicial review in enforcement proceedings; (2) statutes such as the Toxic Substances Control Act that expressly authorize or contemplate review in enforcement proceedings; and (3) statutes such as the Hobbs Act that are silent about judicial review in enforcement proceedings.
The Court, citing Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U. S. 369, 402 (2024), found that for this third category, fundamental principles of administrative law establish the proper default rule: in enforcement proceedings, district courts must independently determine whether an agency’s statutory interpretation is correct, rather than being bound by the agency’s interpretation. The Court found that this presumption of judicial review is codified in Administrative Procedure Act, which provides that agency action is subject to judicial review in enforcement proceedings except where there is prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for review. Furthermore, the Court found that the availability of pre-enforcement review does not ordinarily preclude judicial review in enforcement proceedings.
Takeaways
First, the Court declined to decide whether the FCC’s interpretation of junk faxes is correct. This case will now be sent back to a district judge to make that determination.
Second, the Court’s decision creates uncertainty for companies facing TCPA litigation. Companies now will not be able to rely on prior FCC orders to provide guidance and precedent, since federal courts are not bound by the agency’s interpretation. Plaintiffs’ attorneys are almost certain to try to take advantage of this ruling and revisit cases that previously relied on FCC orders to make decisions.
Third, this decision is a continuation of Loper Bright in the Court’s quest to limit the deference federal courts give agencies. The Court seems to be making clear that the Congress will need to be very specific in the review and enforcement authority delegated to an agency, otherwise, agency determinations can and will be subject to judicial review.
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1 The Hobbs Act also governs review of certain actions of the Department of Agriculture, Department of Transportation, Federal Maritime Commission, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Surface Transportation Board, and Department of Housing and Urban Development
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