On June 30, 2025, the Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari from Cox Communications Inc. and agreed to weigh in on one of the most consequential digital copyright cases in recent memory. The Court’s ruling could redefine the scope of liability for internet service providers (“ISP”) and clarify the standards for contributory infringement and willfulness in the digital age.
How We Got Here
In 2018, a coalition of more than 50 major record labels filed suit against Cox in the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging that Cox had turned a blind eye to massive copyright infringement occurring over its network, primarily via peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms like BitTorrent. The plaintiffs alleged that although Cox received tens of thousands of infringement notices, it failed to take meaningful action to curb the infringing activity of its subscribers—often refusing to terminate repeat offenders.
The plaintiffs asserted that Cox was both contributorily and vicariously liable for its subscribers' copyright infringement. They argued that Cox’s continued provision of internet service to known infringers amounts to Cox materially contributing to the infringement and that Cox profited from this infringement by retaining customers whose primary interest in the service was illicit downloading. After the case went to trial in 2019, the jury returned one of the largest copyright verdicts in U.S. history—Cox was found liable for both contributory and vicarious copyright infringement and was ordered to pay $1 billion in statutory damages. Cox appealed the decision, and in 2024, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued a split decision.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the jury’s finding of contributory infringement, holding that Cox’s failure to act on infringement notices—particularly in the face of overwhelming evidence of repeat violations—constituted a form of material contribution under established copyright law. The Fourth Circuit also upheld the jury’s finding of willful infringement, concluding that Cox knew about the infringing conduct and continued to allow it, thereby meeting the standard for enhanced statutory damages. However, the Fourth Circuit reversed the finding of vicarious liability, determining that the record lacked sufficient evidence that Cox received a direct financial benefit from the infringing conduct. The labels pointed to the general subscription fees Cox collected from infringing users, but the Fourth Circuit found that this was not enough to meet the legal threshold—there needed to be a more specific nexus between the infringement and Cox’s financial gain. Because vicarious liability was part of the basis for the original damages award, the Fourth Circuit vacated the $1 billion judgment and remanded the case for a new trial on damages.
After the Fourth Circuit’s decision, both plaintiffs and Cox sought Supreme Court review. The Supreme Court granted Cox’s petition but denied the plaintiffs’ petition to reinstate the finding of vicarious liability, leaving the Fourth Circuit’s reversal on vicarious liability in place.
Potential Implications
Cox’s petition asks the Supreme Court to review three critical questions:
- Contributory liability via “material contribution” — Does an ISP become contributorily liable by merely failing to disconnect accounts after receiving infringement notices, even absent active facilitation of piracy?
- The standard for “willful” infringement (§ 504(c)(2)) — Is knowledge of customer wrongdoing enough to make the ISP’s inaction “willful,” even if the ISP isn’t aware its own conduct is unlawful?
- Proof required for vicarious liability — Must a copyright holder prove the ISP received a financial benefit directly tied to infringing activities to trigger vicarious liability?
The Supreme Court’s eventual ruling on these issues is poised to have sweeping implications for how internet service providers and digital platforms more broadly police copyright infringement on their networks. A ruling affirming the Fourth Circuit’s expansive view on contributory infringement could fundamentally reshape the legal landscape for internet service providers and digital platforms, all of which operate large subscriber bases and regularly receive copyright infringement notices from rights holders.
If the Supreme Court affirms that “material contribution” includes simply failing to take action after receiving infringement alerts, ISPs may be forced to implement far more aggressive termination policies. This could result in the automatic disconnection of users based on third-party notices—raising concerns about due process, user privacy, and the potential for mistaken accusations. For instance, a parent sharing a home Wi-Fi connection with a college student could see their internet cut off for behavior they didn’t even know was occurring.
On the other hand, a ruling in favor of Cox could make it significantly harder for copyright holders—particularly in the music, film, and publishing industries—to hold ISPs accountable when their networks are used to facilitate mass infringement. Rights holders have increasingly shifted their focus away from pursuing individual infringers (which has proven unpopular and often unproductive) and toward targeting the intermediaries who they argue are in the best position to stop widespread piracy. If the Supreme Court narrows the scope of contributory liability, this strategy could be dealt a major blow, forcing content owners to find new enforcement approaches in a rapidly evolving digital marketplace.
The ripple effects of the Supreme Court’s decision may also extend beyond traditional ISPs. While the Cox case is formally limited to ISPs, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of concepts like “willfulness” and “material contribution” will likely inform broader legal standards for service providers and digital platforms who sit at the intersection of user access and content distribution, such as cloud storage providers like Dropbox, web hosting services like GoDaddy, platforms which host user-generated content like Reddit or Discord, and even AI companies which receive repeated take-down requests or copyright infringement notices.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s decision may answer a long-lingering question in copyright law: how far must an intermediary go to avoid liability for the infringing acts of others?
