On June 9, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California issued a preliminary injunction in San Francisco A.I.D.S. Foundation, et. al. v. Trump, 25-cv-01824-JST (N.D. Cal.), enjoining three of the nine provisions of Executive Orders 14151, 14173, and 14168. Specifically, the Court enjoined the named defendants from enforcing (1) the provision of Executive Order 14151 that requires the termination of all “equity-related” contracts and grants, and (2) provisions of Executive Order 14168 requiring the termination of all funding for any programs that “promote gender ideology.” Although this recent opinion and corresponding preliminary injunction applies narrowly to only the specific plaintiffs and the specific government agencies in the case, it provides insight into how courts are addressing challenges to these Executive Orders.
The plaintiffs in the case are a group of nonprofit organizations that provide healthcare, social services, and advocacy for LGBTQ communities—many specifically serving transgender individuals—and that rely heavily on federal funding to carry out their missions. The plaintiffs challenged Executive Order Nos. 14151 and 14173, which we have previously reported on, as well as 14168, which we do not discuss here.
After determining that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring some of their challenges, including to the Enforcement Threat Provision of Executive Order 14173 (EO 14173), the Court addressed the Termination Provision of Executive Order 14151 (EO 14151) and the Certification Provision of EO 14173.
The Court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their challenge to the Termination Provision of EO 14151, which directs agencies to terminate funding for all “equity-related grants or contracts,” for being impermissibly vague under the Fifth Amendment. Under the Fifth Amendment, speakers are protected from arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of vague standards. The Court reasoned that the vagueness of the language “equity-related” and the lack of any definition is likely to inhibit the exercise of freedom of expression because it provides no guidance to grantees as to how they can modify their expression to avoid termination or from even assessing what grants are implicated. The Court also found that the plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on their claim that the Termination Provision violates the constitutional Separation of Powers as applied to certain grants the plaintiffs receive based on the premise that only Congress has the power to rescind grant funding.
The Court declined to grant a preliminary injunction with respect to the Certification Provision of EO 14173, which requires contractors and grantees to certify that they do not operate any programs promoting DEI that violate any federal anti-discrimination laws. The Court found that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits for their First Amendment claim because the Certification Provision implicates the operation of programs that both promote DEI and “violate any applicable Federal anti-discrimination laws.” The Court reasoned that, while the First Amendment may protect speech that advocates for violation of law, it does not protect activities that directly violate anti-discrimination law. The Court likewise held that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits for their Fifth Amendment Due Process claim for the same reason: that the government is targeting only DEI activity that violates federal antidiscrimination laws and not DEI activity in general.
The Court’s order provides temporary relief only to the named plaintiffs in the lawsuit. All other federal government contractors and grantees remain subject to enforcement.
