In a previous JD Supra article, I wrote about the Sixth Circuit Court’s initial decision, which upheld class certification for the matter despite GM’s challenges to Article III and predominance, in the case of Speerly v. General Motors. For additional context, click here to read more on the previous ruling. That decision was vacated when the Court decided to grant rehearing, en banc. The full Court’s decision on the rehearing is summarized below.
Case Background
In August 2024, a U.S. Sixth Circuit panel affirmed a district court’s class certification of twenty-six state-wide subclasses, offering an interesting case study in legal thresholds for predominance, causation, and economic loss. The case, Speerly v. General Motors, centers around purchaser claims related to alleged defects in General Motors’s (“GM”) 8L45 and 8L90 transmissions, including issues such as “shuddering” and poor shift quality that remained even if and when they brought the car in to be repaired.
At the time, the panel’s decision underscored key developments in the law governing class certification, Article III standing, and the treatment of manifest defects in consumer claims. However, a rehearing was granted in March 2025, and the full Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed.1
Article III Standing
Initially, the Court reviewed Article III to determine whether it had jurisdiction over the case.
Two factors complicated the “injury-in-fact” analysis. First, some courts forbid purchasers without manifest defects from “piggybacking” on those injured with manifest defects. For example, the Seventh Circuit recently held that overpayment-based injuries are to exclude products that only present potential—not actual—risks of harm.
Second, the class-action posture of this case raised concerns. The Court noted that the Supreme Court had not yet decided whether the lack of standing by unnamed class members raises an Article III issue. However, the Court agreed that—at a minimum—the class representatives must present an injury.
The plaintiffs were requesting the Court to turn the 33 individual lawsuits—involving dozens of vehicles—into a single class action. Such joinder, if approved, could increase the number of vehicles to 800,000, which the Court characterized as an “exponential aggregation” of parties, significantly raising the stakes of the litigation. The Court, nevertheless, focused on the named plaintiffs, whose allegations were sufficient to invoke subject-matter jurisdiction.
Commonality
In terms of commonality, the proponents attempted to boil the case down to three general questions: (1) whether the transmissions had shift and shudder defects, (2) whether GM was aware of the defects, and (3) whether the defects were material. Rejecting commonality, the Court found that this type of inquiry was much too simplistic, with the majority noting that:
“A court may not simply ask whether generalized questions yield a common answer. That would undermine the bedrock principle that courts must identify common questions with respect to concrete elements of each claim. By hitching all 59 claims to a question about 'defect' in the abstract, the court overlooked how significant differences across each cause of action raise serious commonality concerns. The plaintiffs, to illustrate the point, claim that the court may answer whether a 'defect' exists in each transmission in one stroke. But that is not necessarily so in the context of the relevant elements of each claim. Do the plaintiffs mean 'defect' in the products-liability sense because it is 'unreasonably dangerous'? Or do they mean 'defect' in an implied warranty sense, as in unfit for the ordinary purposes for which the accused products are used? Or do they mean 'defect' in the sense of a consumer-protection statute, which asks if the feature diminished the value of the product?”
Predominance
Even assuming commonality, the consolidation of 800,000 claims also raises manageability issues under the predominance and superiority prongs. Namely, the financial and logistical challenges of asking one district court to take on and apply around sixty causes of action across twenty-six different states, not to mention having two different defects, each with differing facts and theories.
A class of this size and complexity, the majority held, would overly burden a district court to act as a “central planner” to twenty-six states under one case, and—as a model—raises even more questions. Would a single jury decide on a winner? How could citizens from one state accurately interpret the legal standards of other states? How would a court form a jury representative of all twenty-six states?
Additionally, the plaintiffs allege two separate defects—shuddering and shifting. Both defect theories entail different facts, legal standards, and consumer experiences. With variations in each state’s laws, even if only slightly (perhaps regarding whether a plaintiff must show reliance or a manifest defect), it would be easy for uniformity in the class action to deteriorate. The Court ultimately ruled that the proposed structure of consolidating these suits was too difficult to carry out and did not meet the predominance standard.
Arbitration Agreements
The Court also addressed the role of arbitration agreements that were arguably applicable to some of the class members’ claims. The record included only twenty such agreements—too few to determine how many of the 800,000 vehicles might or might not be bound to arbitration.
The Court rejected the district court’s assumption that GM’s decision to waive arbitration with respect to the named plaintiffs’ claims extended to the entire class. That type of waiver, the Court explained, cannot bind unnamed class members prior to certification.
Conclusion
The Sixth Circuit’s en banc reversal in Speerly v. General Motors reinforces the high bar set for certifying multistate class actions. By emphasizing the need for more granular analysis, the Court suggested that such class actions are likely better pursued on a State-by-State basis.
1 Speerly v. General Motors, No.23-1940, 2025 WL 1775640 (6th Cir. June 27, 2025) (en banc).
