In its decision published on 10 July 2025, the Turkish Competition Authority (‘Authority’) has clearly established that restrictions on employment between organisations may constitute anti-competitive agreements in violation of Turkish competition law. The decision is being seen as a major step towards protecting employee economic freedom and safeguarding competition in labour markets. In this article, we examine the scope of the ruling which sets out important criteria for determining when and how such agreements violate Turkish competition law.
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The investigation
The Authority’s decision is the conclusion of an investigation it conducted into the impact of no-poach agreements on the labour market. These are agreements made between organisations not to employ each other’s personnel.
The organisations subject to the investigation included organisations from various sectors such as software, e-commerce, retail, logistics, food, advertising, and telecommunications. The scope of the no-poach agreements in question often extended beyond specific departments such as engineering, human resources, or marketing, and covered nearly all employees of the organisations involved.
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Findings by the Authority
According to the Authority, in order to establish an agreement that violates Turkish competition law, the existence of a meeting of the minds (or ‘concurrence of wills’) between organisations is sufficient, even in the absence of a written agreement. Implicit, verbal, or de facto understandings may also be considered ‘agreements’ for the purposes of competition law.
No-poach agreements may take various forms, including a mutual commitment not to solicit each other’s employees, refusing to hire candidates from rival firms even if they apply, or refraining from hiring individuals solely because they were formerly employed by a competitor. In some cases, mutual consent mechanisms have been used, but such mechanisms do not eliminate the existence of an infringement.
The Authority found that these types of no-poach agreements are “by-object restrictions”, that is, a type of agreement which by its very nature has the objective of restricting competition without the need to demonstrate actual effects in the market. It concluded that these agreements suppress wages, reduce labour mobility, and ultimately have adverse effects on overall economic welfare, including consumer welfare.
The Authority also found that the organisations in its investigation knew that employee movement triggers wage increases, and that the true purpose of no-poach agreements was to control labour costs. These practices were therefore considered to have similar effects to price-fixing agreements.
The decision further reveals that terms such as “off-limits”, “blacklist” and “gentlemen’s agreement” were frequently used among organisations and that such expressions may indicate the existence of a restrictive agreement. Even in the absence of a formal agreement, it was emphasised that the exchange of competitively sensitive information—such as employment benefits, bonuses, or hiring strategies—among organisations may also constitute a competition law infringement.
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What about non-compete agreements?
In its decision, the Authority draws a clear distinction between no-poach agreements and individual non-compete agreements made between employers and employees under the Turkish Code of Obligations. According to the Authority, non-compete clauses under the Code must be:
- specific to certain employees;
- in written form, subject to judicial review, and limited in scope and duration; and
- based on a legitimate justification and must not jeopardise the employee’s economic future.
In contrast, inter-organisation no-poach agreements are typically unwritten, developed without employee knowledge, apply to all employees, and are based on mutual understandings between organisations. As such, they should not be confused with legally valid individual restrictions and must rather be viewed as violations of Turkish competition law.
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When can a no-poach agreement be legitimate?
The Authority also noted that some no-poach provisions may be considered legitimate “ancillary restraints” under specific conditions. Obligations not to hire the employees of a target organisation in merger or acquisition transactions, along with non-compete and trade secret protection clauses, for example, may be deemed lawful provided that they are proportionate and limited in scope and duration. However, such exceptions must be interpreted narrowly, and it should not be assumed that every no-poach provision qualifies as an ancillary restraint. In practice, the Authority has only recognised such exceptions in the context of genuine acquisition transactions and emphasised the need for proportionality regarding contract duration and scope.
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Takeaway for employers
This decision constitutes a landmark precedent in addressing anti-competitive agreements among organisations in the labour market. In light of this ruling, any direct or indirect restrictions on hiring imposed by organisations pose significant competition law risks. It is therefore vital that HR policies and procedures (namely hiring practices) are carefully reviewed to ensure compliance with Turkish competition law. This should be a regular, ongoing process.
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