Statements of pure opinion are not actionable as defamation, as they do not imply facts capable of being proven true or false. Qureshi v. St. Barnabas Hosp. Ctr., 430 F. Supp. 2d 279, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Cochran v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1121 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
However, not every opinion qualifies as a pure opinion. And not every opinion is safe from liability for defamation. Some opinions cross the line.
A recent court decision in Fradkoff v. Winston out of the Southern District of New York sheds light on how, and when, opinions may become defamatory.
Fradkoff, the plaintiff, and Winston, the defendant, both worked for a prestigious jewelry company founded by the defendant’s father. Fradkoff v. Winston, 24 Civ. 1830 (VM), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118444, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2025). After his father’s death, the defendant assumed control of the company and later published a biography about his father’s leadership. Id. The book portrayed the plaintiff negatively, and the plaintiff brought a defamation claim. Id. at *3-4.
The defendant moved to dismiss. Id. In evaluating the motion, the court considered both the broader context of the book and five specific statements the plaintiff alleged were defamatory. Id.
The five challenged statements were:
1. “I sensed they were stealing my family’s money”;
2. “it takes a thief to catch a thief”;
3. “because there was honor among thieves, Fradkoff never called Bochatay on any of his suspected transgressions”;
4. “Fradkoff . . . was betting the farm using Harry Winston’s funds . . . not only a high crime but a major disaster in the making”; and
5. “Serge [Fradkoff] paid us back in full, reversing his thievery.” Id.
Pure Opinion / Context Matters
The plaintiff first claimed the defendant defamed him with the statement, “I sensed they [including Fradkoff] were stealing my family’s money.” Id. at *12-13. The defendant avoided liability for this first challenged statement because his statement was pure opinion due to the context of the statement. Id. The court reasoned that a statement is not actionable if the accusation is merely an opinion. Id. at *11-13.The court acknowledged that it was the context of the statement made it an opinion instead of a fact. Id. In particular, the defendant wrote that he had, “sensed an increasingly sinister ambience,” and that, “there was nothing tangible, just a slight whiff of putrescence.” Id. (emphasis added). Because the defendant merely “sensed” the alleged criminality, the court found that the reasonable reader would understand his statement to be a non-actionable opinion. Id.
However, the context of the defendant’s fifth challenged statement was not a protected opinion. Id. at *17, *25. The context implied that the plaintiff returned the money he allegedly stole from the company under threat of exposure. Id. at *16. The court concluded that a reader may understand that the plaintiff committed a crime because another statement alleged that the plaintiff misused the company funds for a “high crime.” Id. at *17.
Context is equally important under California law. In the landmark case of Baker v. L.A. Herald Exam’r, the California Supreme Court held that the context in which the statement is made determines if the statement is an opinion or fact. 42 Cal. 3d 254, 263 (1986). The court reasoned that because the defendant wrote the statement in a highly critical, inflammatory review, the context of the challenged statements “clearly conveyed” the defendant’s non-actionable opinion. Id. at 265.
Rhetorical Hyperbole
The plaintiff claimed that the defendant’s second and third challenged statements, “it takes a thief to catch a thief” and “there is honor among thieves,” implied that the plaintiff had committed crimes. However, the court found otherwise. Fradkoff, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118444, at *14. Because these statements were vague and hyperbolic, the court ruled they were merely the defendant’s opinion, which is non-actionable under defamation law. Id. The court rejected the notion that these statements constituted a fact about the plaintiff’s criminal conduct because of the statements’ exaggerated, inflammatory language. Id.
Loose, figurative language is a type of speech protected from state libel actions and cannot reasonably be interpreted as an assertion of fact. Robert D. Sack, Sack on Defamation: Libel, Slander, and Related Problems § 4:3.3 (5th ed. 2019). The same is true in California courts. In Seelig v. Infinity Broad. Corp., the court found that the defendant’s statement describing the plaintiff as a “skank” was non-actionable rhetorical hyperbole because the word is too vague to be proven true or false. 97 Cal. App. 4th 798, 811 (2002). Thus, no listener would interpret the statement to be an actual fact. Id.
Opinion Based on Undisclosed Facts
The court ruled that the defendant’s fourth challenged statement was not a protected opinion because it implied the existence of undisclosed facts unfavorable to the plaintiff. Fradkoff, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118444, at *15-16.
Here, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff misused company funds, which the defendant described as a “high crime.” Id. Because the defendant’s statement provided no facts to support his allegation and because the defendant had intimate knowledge of the transaction due to his position in the company, the court held the statement was not a protected opinion. Id. at *15, *17.
However, if the opinion is based on a disclosed fact, then the opinion may not be actionable. Opinions based on fully disclosed facts can be punished only if the stated facts are themselves false. Sack, supra, § 4:3.2. Take the following example: “[Jones] moved in six months ago. He works downtown, and I have seen him during that time only twice, in his backyard around 5:30 seated in a deck chair . . . with a drink in his hand. I think he must be an alcoholic.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 556 cmt. c, illus. 4 (Am. L. Inst. 1965). Because the statement, “I think he must be an alcoholic,” indicates the facts that the speaker relied on, the speaker here is not liable for defamation. Id.
The same is true in the 9th Circuit. In Standing Comm. on Discipline of the United States Dist. Court v. Yagman, a disciplinary standing committee sought sanctions against a lawyer defendant because the defendant accused a judge of being antisemitic. 55 F.3d 1430, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995). The defendant justified his conclusion by stating that the judge “has a penchant for sanctioning Jewish lawyers: me, David Kenner and Hugh Manes.” Id. Because the defendant disclosed the facts underlying his opinion and those facts were true, the court found the defendant’s statement to be non-actionable defamation. Id. at 1440. The court clarified that readers were free to form possibly contradictory opinions from the same facts. Id.
Conclusion
Fradkoff v. Winston reminds us that in defamation law, the line between protected opinion and actionable statement depends not just on what is said, but how it’s said. Context, rhetorical hyperbole, and whether facts are disclosed all shape whether a statement crosses into defamatory territory.
